University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2019

Investing in Corporate Procedure
Jessica M. Erickson
University of Richmond - School of Law, jerickso@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons
Recommended Citation
Jessica Erickson, Investing in Corporate Procedure, 99 B. U. L. Rev. 1367 (2019).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

INVESTING IN CORPORATE PROCEDURE
JESSICA ERICKSON*

ABSTRACT
Corporate litigation is in crisis. At the state level, shareholder lawsuits
challenging mergers and other corporate decisions are ubiquitous but rarely
end with meaningful relief for shareholders. At the federal level, securities class
actions are rife with ethical challenges and low-value settlements. Over the last
several decades, multiple groups—including judges, legislatures, and corporate
boards—have tried to solve this problem, but all have come up short. This
Article argues that the solution lies in rewriting the procedural rules that govern
corporate lawsuits. New standing requirements would lead to better screening
of these claims. Discovery limits and heightened pleading requirements would
give defendants better tools to fight frivolous claims. All of these new
procedures, if incorporated into corporate bylaws, would apply wherever the
corporation is sued to address forum shopping, a common feature in these suits.
Just as importantly, institutional investors should take the lead in crafting these
procedures. They stand on both sides of these lawsuits and are therefore
financially invested in ensuring that corporate lawsuits live up to their potential.
It is their money on the line if corporate managers breach their fiduciary duties,
but also their money on the line if corporations have to pay to defend against
meritless litigation. The time has come for shareholders to invest in procedure
to solve the enduring problems in corporate litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate litigation is in crisis. Once a key pillar of the law’s efforts to control
agency costs, corporate litigation is now roundly derided as a failed experiment.1
In merger litigation, shareholder plaintiffs challenge nearly every significant
merger and acquisition but too often settle these claims for nonmonetary
consideration that offers little benefit to the shareholder class.2 In derivative
litigation a similar phenomenon exists, with shareholders frequently settling for
modest relief that does not benefit plaintiff corporations.3 And in securities class
actions, a persistent crop of cases settles for nuisance amounts, while other suits
raise complex ethical questions about the recruitment of shareholder clients.4
There are bright spots—meritorious suits that return real value to shareholders—
but overall, the outlook is bleak.
Shareholder litigation suffers from these problems because it differs from
other forms of litigation in two important ways.5 First, these suits have far
1
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 851, 852 (2016) (stating that the problems in shareholder litigation have reached
“crisis proportions”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 292 (2010) (discussing how problems in shareholder
litigation “remain intractable despite repeated efforts by Congress and the courts to curb
highly visible abuses”); James D. Cox, How Understanding the Nature of Corporate Norms
Can Prevent Their Destruction by Settlements, 66 DUKE L.J. 501, 503 (2016) (stating that
shareholder litigation “is very much a part of, if not now central to, the litigation-explosion
debate”).
2
See Dias v. Purches, No. 7199VCG, 2012 WL 4503174, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2012)
(stating that after merger announcement, litigation “typically follow[s] like mushrooms
follow the rain” and disclosure-only settlements “create a risk of excessive merger litigation,
where the costs to stockholders exceed the benefits”); Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven
Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559 (2015) (“Although
deal litigation is pervasive, these lawsuits rarely result in a monetary recovery for the plaintiff
class.”).
3
See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1830 (2010) (“Mounting empirical evidence reveals that the
vast majority of shareholder derivative suits do not benefit the corporations on whose behalf
the suits are brought.”); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 63 (1991) (presenting empirical evidence that parties
often settled derivative suits in exchange for “cosmetic” corporate governance reforms and
concluding that “[a] likely explanation” for these settlements “is the need to paper a record to
justify an award of attorneys’ fees to courts”).
4
See LAARNI T. BULAN, ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2016 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2016), https://
www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2016Review-and-Analysis [https://perma.cc/XKC4-QWDH].
5
Other forms of aggregate litigation, such as consumer class actions, can also suffer from
these problems. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336-37 (2011)
(alleging each individual plaintiff’s harm was roughly thirty dollars in class action brought
against AT&T). In shareholder litigation, however, defendants can exit the litigation in a less
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greater agency costs. In most lawsuits, the plaintiff directly controls his or her
attorney. In shareholder litigation, however, most shareholder plaintiffs do not
have sufficient economic incentives to closely monitor their attorneys.6 As a
result, these attorneys effectively control the litigation, allowing them to make
litigation decisions that benefit themselves at the expense of their shareholder
clients.7 Second, shareholder litigation suffers from cost asymmetries.8 In most
cases, contrary to conventional wisdom, the parties’ litigation costs are roughly
equivalent.9 In shareholder litigation, however, defendants’ costs far exceed
plaintiffs’ costs.10 As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys have strong incentives to file
meritless suits, and the defendants have equally strong incentives to settle.
The legal system has long tried to solve these problems. In the 1990s,
Congress overhauled the rules governing securities class actions,11 but its efforts
did too little to preserve meritorious cases and not enough to stamp out meritless
ones.12 More recently, states deputized corporate directors to adopt new
procedural rules to govern these lawsuits,13 but directors are typically among the

costly manner by offering nonmonetary consideration in exchange for a settlement. As
discussed below, this option, which is not available in most types of class actions, exacerbates
the problems in shareholder litigation.
6
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (arguing high agency costs in class action and derivative litigation
primarily are due to the inability of the class to effectively monitor attorneys).
7
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers
in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 22 (2016) (“[T]he benefits
created by [shareholder litigation] are qualified by the litigation agency costs that surround
them.”).
8
See Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 61, 71 (2016)
(“Meritorious or not, however, these cases are profitable for plaintiffs’ lawyers for at least
two reasons, both having to do with cost asymmetries.”).
9
The data does not support the oft-repeated claim that discovery costs are out of control
across the board. For example, in 2009, the Federal Judicial Center found that most attorneys
in the study stated that they thought the amount and costs of discovery in their cases was “just
the right amount.” See CASE EMERY G. LEE, III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1-2, 28 (2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/
files/materials/08/CivilRulesSurvey2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZC4-FR6Y] (providing
costs of litigation statistics for plaintiffs and defendants).
10
See Erickson, supra note 8, at 71 (“[A]lmost all discovery [in shareholder litigation] is
in the hands of the defendants.”).
11
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
12
See Section I.A (describing shortcomings of shareholder litigation).
13
See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) (validating
authority of corporations to adopt fee-shifting provisions in bylaws for unsuccessful plaintiffs
in intracorporate litigation); In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch.
2010) (discussing Delaware statute authorizing corporations to enact limits on powers of
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defendants in shareholder lawsuits, and therefore they drafted procedural rules
that reflect this bias.14 And more recently, Delaware judges tried to take back
control over these cases by more closely scrutinizing low-value settlements,15
but their efforts only emboldened plaintiffs’ attorneys to file their cases in other
jurisdictions.16 In sum, various groups have tried to fix the problems in
shareholder litigation, but their efforts have all come up short.
This Article argues that the solution lies in rewriting the procedural rules that
govern shareholder litigation. Procedure is typically transsubstantive, which
means that the same rules apply in all civil cases.17 Yet, in practice, civil
litigation is not one size fits all, and other types of cases do not suffer from the
problems that wreak such havoc in shareholder litigation.18 Given these unique
problems, it makes sense to have unique procedural rules for this subset of cases.
Corporate law has experimented with procedural reform in modest ways,19
but it has not taken advantage of the full panoply of available options. The field
shareholders that are not contrary to Delaware law).
14
See, e.g., Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater:
Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate
Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 515-16 (2016) (discussing negative implications for
shareholders resulting from director-imposed fee shifting provisions in shareholder litigation).
15
See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 896 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Given the
rapid proliferation and current ubiquity of deal litigation, the mounting evidence that
supplemental disclosures rarely yield genuine benefits for stockholders, the risk of
stockholders losing potentially valuable claims that have not been investigated with rigor, and
the challenges of assessing disclosure claims in a nonadversarial settlement process, the
Court’s historical predisposition toward approving disclosure settlements needs to be
reexamined.”).
16
See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can
Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN
CHANGING TIMES 292, 293 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2017) (“The
stampede of filings to alternative jurisdictions can plausibly be explained by the plaintiffs’
bar’s reaction to Trulia and to the cases leading up to it.”).
17
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.”); see also Paul
D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of
the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 2067, 208081 (1989) (“Generalism in civil procedure is, in the Anglo-American tradition, about a century
older than the Federal Rules . . . .”).
18
Cf. Erickson, supra note 8, at 63 (explaining that “[t]he challenges of prisoner litigation
are different from the challenges of securities class actions, which are different still from the
challenges of medical malpractice and patent cases”).
19
Specifically, a significant number of companies have experimented with two types of
procedural private ordering: forum selection provisions and fee-shifting provisions. A handful
have tried a few other types, including minimum ownership requirements and arbitration
provisions. Other types, such as customized pleading standards or discovery rules, have been
largely absent from corporate governing documents. See, e.g., Jonathan G. Rohr, Corporate
Governance, Collective Action and Contractual Freedom: Justifying Delaware’s New
Restrictions on Private Ordering, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 803, 805 (2017) (describing how “some
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of civil procedure offers specific solutions to the problems of agency costs and
cost asymmetries seen in shareholder litigation. When it comes to agency costs,
forum selection clauses can keep these cases under the eyes of watchful judges,
especially if they are not waivable by corporate boards. Similarly, new standing
requirements can ensure that the shareholders who bring these cases have a real
financial interest in their outcome. When it comes to cost asymmetries,
heightened pleading requirements can require shareholders to put their cards on
the table before proceeding to discovery, while cost shifting can provide a more
equitable distribution of litigation expenses.
Identifying the right procedural solutions, however, is only one piece of the
puzzle. It is equally important to identify who will push for these reforms, given
the long history of failed reform efforts in this area. This history reveals that
most groups are unlikely to advocate for the right procedural reforms. This void
presents an opportunity for a new group—institutional investors—to take the
lead by amending corporate bylaws to include new procedures that would
govern these cases. Institutional investors have the right financial incentives to
adopt these procedures because they stand on both sides of shareholder lawsuits.
It is their money on the line if corporate managers breach their fiduciary duties,
but also their money on the line if corporations have to pay to defend against
meritless litigation.20 Many are also involved in activism efforts and understand
the value of litigation in controlling managerial behavior. In short, they stand
alone in having the right financial incentives and organizational structure to
tackle these problems.
Advocating for procedural reform would be a new form of activism for
institutional investors, but they would not need to embark on it alone. Indeed,
although shareholders can technically amend corporate bylaws on their own,21
the dispersed ownership at most public companies makes doing so extremely
difficult.22 Instead, institutional investors should partner with corporate boards
and other relevant stakeholders to draft procedural rules that are then
incorporated into a corporation’s bylaws. This approach circumvents many of
Delaware corporations began to experiment with so-called ‘private-ordering solutions’ to
escape the[] abusive practices” in shareholder litigation, including specifically forum
selection bylaws and fee-shifting bylaws).
20
See, e.g., Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 494
(2016) (“What is special about shareholder litigation––and differentiates it from consumer
litigation––is that in some sense, shareholders are always on both sides of the
litigation. . . . One consequence of this feature is that shareholders may benefit from some
limitations on shareholder litigation.”).
21
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (“After a corporation other than a nonstock
corporation has received any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal
bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote.”).
22
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws,
106 CAL. L. REV. 373, 377 (2018) (“Within the context of the New Governance, the board’s
power to adopt and amend bylaw provisions may, for a variety of reasons, be greater than the
shareholders’ power to do so.”).
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the practical difficulties of a shareholder-led approach, while also addressing the
potential biases of other constituencies. In short, institutional investors are
uniquely positioned to be thought leaders in this area, investing in a new
approach to corporate procedure.
This path to reform would help solve the problems in shareholder litigation,
but it does raise complex legal questions regarding the authority of shareholders
and corporate boards. This authority likely depends on whether the lawsuit is
filed under state or federal law. Under state law, which governs nearly all
shareholder derivative suits and many merger class actions, corporations likely
have broad power to rewrite procedural rules. Delaware, in particular, is quite
accommodating of private ordering in this area.23 Under federal law, which
governs securities class actions, however, there is less flexibility to change these
rules.24 This Article is thus intended as a thought experiment, exploring the
possibilities of procedural private ordering, while recognizing that, under current
state and federal law, corporations may not have the freedom to adopt every
variant of these rules.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the current crisis in
shareholder litigation as well as the problems that gave rise to this crisis. Part II
explains how procedure can address these problems, describing both why
procedural reform is the right approach and exploring specific procedural
solutions. Part III explores why institutional investors are the right group to take
the lead in developing these new procedures. The time has come for institutional
investors to bring their stake in corporate America to bear in rewriting corporate
procedure.
I.

THE FAILURE OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

Shareholder litigation is a key weapon in the law’s arsenal to control
managerial agency costs. Corporate law has traditionally given shareholders
only three avenues to control agency costs: they can vote on select corporate
decisions, sell their stock, and sue the corporation and its managers for legal
violations.25 While the first two rights remain relatively strong,26 the right to sue
23

See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.C.
25
See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216
(1999) (“Shareholders have only a limited role: They can vote, sell, or sue.”).
26
This does not mean that the right to vote and the right to sell are perfect, however, as
many scholars have noted. See, e.g., David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal,
Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 174 (2015)
(“Like many instances of voting by a dispersed base, shareholder voting is subject to freerider problems because any individual shareholder receives only a small fraction of the benefit
from casting a correct vote, but it bears the full cost of researching matters subject to vote.”);
Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 384
(2004) (explaining that while “opportunistic behavior in public corporations may be
24
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has come under increasing criticism. This Part first explains the widespread
problems with shareholder litigation before turning to the economic and
institutional incentives that explain these problems.
A.

How It Failed

The world of shareholder litigation is diverse, offering an array of options to
hold corporations and their managers accountable for misdeeds. The focus here
is on the three main litigation options under state and federal law. First, under
state law, shareholders can file a class action in connection with a merger or
acquisition if they believe that the merger price was too low or the merger
disclosures were inadequate.27 Second, also under state law,28 shareholders can
file a derivative suit if the corporation was directly hurt by its directors’ or
officers’ breach of fiduciary duty.29 Finally, under federal law, shareholders can
file a securities class action to challenge a corporation’s misstatements to the
market.30 As this Section explains, these three types of lawsuits have each
experienced a high proportion of low-value settlements, although these
settlements look different in the three different areas.
1.

Merger Class Actions

By almost any measure, merger class actions are in disarray. Over the last ten
years, the number of suits challenging mergers and acquisitions skyrocketed. In
2007, shareholders challenged forty-four percent of large mergers and
acquisitions in court.31 By 2014, the percentage had increased to ninety-three

constrained by the market; by definition, close corporations lack a market, and therefore lack
this monitor” (footnote omitted)).
27
See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Today,
the public announcement of virtually every transaction involving the acquisition of a public
corporation provokes a flurry of class action lawsuits alleging that the target’s directors
breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to sell the corporation for an unfair price.”).
28
In rare instances, shareholders can bring federal claims derivatively, but derivative suits
more commonly include state claims. See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1774 (“[M]ore than 30
percent of the derivative complaints filed on behalf of public companies alleged a claim under
the federal securities laws, under either section 10(b) or 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.”).
29
See Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Recognizing, however,
that directors and officers of a corporation may not hold themselves accountable to the
corporation for their own wrongdoing, courts of equity have created an ingenious device to
police the activities of corporate fiduciaries: the shareholder’s derivative suit.”).
30
See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2401 (2014) (holding
that investors can recover damages in a private securities class action “if they prove that they
relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation in deciding to buy or sell a company’s stock”).
31
See RAVI SINHA, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING
ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION 1
(2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involvin
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percent.32 Whatever one may think of corporate directors, it is hard to imagine
that they breach their fiduciary duties in nearly every significant merger and
acquisition.
This influx of litigation has harmed shareholders. Nearly all of these cases are
dismissed or settle,33 and shareholders almost never receive any monetary
consideration in these settlements. Instead, in eighty percent of these
settlements, the primary consideration was additional disclosures about the
merger.34 Although such disclosures could theoretically be beneficial, empirical
research shows that they almost never change the outcome of the shareholder
vote on the merger.35 If the information disclosed is truly material in informing
shareholders about previously undisclosed problems with the merger, it should
result in a smaller percentage of shareholders voting in favor of the merger.36
The fact that this new information does not impact how shareholders vote
strongly suggests that these settlements do not benefit shareholders.37
As a result, these suits have faced a storm of criticism from nearly all of the
players involved. The Delaware Court of Chancery acknowledged that “far too
often such litigation serves no useful purpose for stockholders, . . . serv[ing]
only to generate fees for certain lawyers.”38 Prominent plaintiffs’ attorneys Mark
Lebovitch and Jeron van Kwawegen publicly acknowledged that the “real
problem” results from “the percentage of these stockholder lawsuits that achieve
little, if anything, for stockholders, while giving away overbroad liability
releases for corporate defendants and paying both plaintiffs’ and defendants’

g-Acquisitions-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ET4-YPDU] (showing percentage of mergers
and acquisition deals challenged by shareholders).
32
See id.
33
See id. at 4 (“Unlike prior years, settlements in 2015 accounted for less than half of all
litigation outcomes.”).
34
See OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING
ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2015),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review
[https://perma.cc/HF8Y-PRWP] (“Similar to prior years, almost 80 percent of settlements
reached in 2014 provided only additional disclosures. Just six settlements [out of 78] involved
payments to shareholders.”).
35
See Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 561 (“[D]isclosure-only settlements do
not appear to affect shareholder voting in any way.”).
36
See id. at 575-76 (“[I]t seems clear that for supplemental disclosures to be meaningful,
they must have a negative impact on shareholder voting in favor of the merger.”).
37
Despite this finding, however, disclosure-only settlements are still profitable for
plaintiffs’ attorneys, with median fees of $500,000 in 2013. See OLGA KOUMRIAN,
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SETTLEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION 3 (2014), https://www.corner
stone.com/Publications/Reports/Settlements-of-M-and-A-Shareholder-Litigation [https://per
ma.cc/X3D3-9BBZ].
38
In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 892 (Del. Ch. 2016).
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lawyers.”39 Other commentators stated that these suits represent a “transaction
tax,”40 “clogging the courts and increasing transaction costs for no reason.”41 Far
from being an effective tool for constraining managerial agency costs, merger
class actions serve as an example of a litigation failure.
2.

Derivative Suits

While the problems in merger litigation have increased exponentially over the
past several years, similar problems have plagued derivative suits for decades.42
The earliest study of derivative suits was conducted in New York in 1944.43 This
study concluded that the “great preponderance” of derivative suits were
“unfounded and speculative.”44 More recent studies have reached similar
conclusions, with one calling derivative suits a “weak, if not ineffective,
instrument of corporate governance”45 and another noting the “problematic role
that these suits continue to play in corporate law.”46
The reason for this criticism is nearly identical to the reason for the criticism
of merger litigation—both types of suits rarely end with monetary settlements.
While disclosure-only settlements are common in merger cases, derivative suits
frequently end with the plaintiff corporation agreeing to make changes to its
corporate governance practices in exchange for dismissal of the suit.47 In theory,
like the disclosure-only settlements in merger litigation, these settlements could
be valuable for corporations and their shareholders, but the reality is much more
bleak. Corporations frequently agree to very modest reforms that bear little
connection to the allegations in the complaint and are unlikely to enhance
shareholder value.48 Although there are bright spots among this criticism,49 the

39

Lebovitch & van Kwawegen, supra note 14, at 494.
Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Transaction Tax: The New Cost of Doing
Business in Public Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 56-59 (2014).
41
Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 591.
42
See Jessica Erickson, The (Un)Changing Derivative Suit, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 58, 66 (Sean Griffith et al. eds., 2018) (“[T]he
more fundamental problem of derivative suits ending with low-value settlements that do not
benefit corporations or their shareholders has been a persistent problem for many decades.”).
43
See FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE
SUITS (1944).
44
Id. at 9.
45
See Romano, supra note 3, at 84.
46
See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1755.
47
See id. at 1754 (“[S]hareholder derivative suits more commonly end with the parties
agreeing to corporate governance settlements.”).
48
See id. at 1755 (“[C]orporate governance settlements often fail to live up to their
potential because they include reforms that are unlikely to benefit corporations or their
shareholders.”).
49
See id. at 1758-59 (explaining how derivative suits filed in connection with backdating
of stock options end with more favorable settlements for plaintiff corporations than derivative
40
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empirical record demonstrates that derivative suits share many of the same
problems that plague merger litigation.
These suits also reward attorneys in much the same way. As with merger
litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to fees from the corporation if the case
confers a benefit on the represented parties, even if the relief is non-monetary.50
Again, in theory, this rule makes sense—if the case confers a benefit on the
corporation, the attorneys should be compensated, regardless of the precise
nature of the relief. In practice, however, courts do little to ensure that the relief
is in fact meaningful to the corporation or the class.51 As one commentator has
stated, the ultimate result is that “attorneys now churn a mass of filings and
settlements,” resulting in “overcompensation of attorneys (on both sides) and
systematic under-compensation of the plaintiff class.”52
3.

Securities Class Actions

On their face, securities class actions look quite different from merger class
actions and derivative suits. First, and perhaps most notably, securities class
actions rarely end with nonmonetary settlements.53 In fact, in 2017 the median
settlement in securities class actions was $5 million, and it is not unusual for
settlements to exceed $100 million.54 Second, unlike both merger class actions
and derivative suits, securities class actions have received their fair share of
major legislative attention. In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), overhauling the law governing securities

suits with other types of allegations); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public
and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749, 1762 (2004)
(reviewing derivative suits filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery and concluding that
“[c]ontrary to earlier studies, we do not find evidence that these cases are ‘strike suits’ yielding
little benefit”).
50
See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation
by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2015) (discussing corporate
benefit doctrine’s requirements).
51
See id. at 5 (“This analysis reveals courts’ current application of the corporate benefit
doctrine as the principal enabler of the systemic overcompensation of lawyers and undercompensation of plaintiffs.”).
52
See id. at 2.
53
This trend may be changing. The recent crackdown on merger litigation in state court
has prompted many plaintiffs’ attorneys to repackage their claims as securities class actions
with the hope that the nonmonetary settlements rejected in state court will pass muster in
federal court. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71
VAND. L. REV 603, 633 (2018) (“Many of the same plaintiffs’ law firms that file deal litigation
also are major players in bringing derivative lawsuits and federal securities class actions.”).
54
See LAARNI T. BULAN, ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE
RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2017 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 5 (2017),
http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2017/Settlements-Through-12-2017Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2XG-ABV2].
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class actions.55 The PSLRA imposed new procedural hurdles and made the
substantive law more stringent in a variety of ways. As a result, it is now far
more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in these suits.
Digging into the data, however, the PSLRA did not solve all of the problems
in securities class actions. First, the PSLRA did not eliminate nuisance suits.
More than a quarter of the settlements in securities class actions are for less than
two million dollars—one commonly used cutoff for nuisance settlements in this
area.56 Second, there is a longstanding concern among scholars that the PSLRA
may bar many meritorious claims. The PSLRA includes heightened pleading
standards that require courts to dismiss any complaint that does not allege facts
creating a “strong inference” that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud.57
This standard is extremely difficult to meet without prior hard evidence of fraud,
such as a restatement or Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
investigation.58 As a result, the PSLRA made it harder for shareholders to file
both meritorious and nonmeritorious claims alike.
Additionally, the PSLRA led to an array of new ethical challenges. It created
a presumption that the lead plaintiff should be the shareholder applicant with the
largest financial stake in the litigation.59 Congress added this presumption to
enhance the role of institutional investors in these suits, with the hope that these
investors would both better screen cases and negotiate lower fees with class
counsel.60 In practice, however, the institutional investors who serve as lead
plaintiffs are often public pension funds, which are typically controlled by
political officials.61 As a result, the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provisions created an
incentive for law firms to make campaign contributions to these officials to

55
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
56
BULAN, RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 5.
57
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A) (2012).
58
See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 601 (2007) (discussing PSLRA’s high
pleading standard).
59
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(l)(bb) (“[T]he court shall adopt a presumption that the
most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this chapter is the person or group
of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in the
relief sought by the class . . . .”).
60
See Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or
“Look What’s Happened to My Baby,” 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 547, 552-53 (2008)
(“[I]nstitutional investors that have sought appointment as lead plaintiff generally have
negotiated fee arrangements with the law firms . . . for percentage fees far lower than had
been the norm prior to passage of the PSLRA. Many institutional lead plaintiffs also have
actively monitored class actions in which they have served as lead plaintiff . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
61
See id. at 552 (stating most lead plaintiff institutional investors are public or union
pension funds).
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secure their appointment as class counsel.62 Empirical studies demonstrate that
the firms that make these contributions receive higher attorneys’ fees, suggesting
that pension funds may negotiate less over fees if campaign contributions are on
the line.63
Stepping back, the data reveals that all three types of shareholder lawsuits—
merger litigation, derivative suits, and securities class actions—frequently end
with low-value settlements that offer little benefit to shareholders. As a result of
Congress’s efforts to crack down on meritless claims in the PSLRA, securities
class actions perform slightly better than their state law counterparts, but these
efforts led to new, unanticipated problems. In the end, if shareholder litigation
is supposed to be the cornerstone of the law’s efforts to constrain corporate
misconduct, it is falling far short of this goal.
B.

Why It Failed

At first glance, this state of affairs is perplexing. Why do shareholders bother
to file lawsuits that they are willing to settle for so little? And, if these claims do
not have merit, why are defendants so willing to settle them? The answer lies in
the unique incentives of shareholder litigation. As this Section explains, these
suits suffer from significant agency costs because many shareholder plaintiffs
do not have a large enough financial stake in the litigation to closely monitor
their attorney. Additionally, the costs of these suits fall disproportionately on
defendants, which makes them willing to settle even those claims they think they
can win. These dynamics explain the seemingly counterintuitive litigation
decisions that plague this area.
1.

Agency Costs

A foundational principle of the American litigation system is that clients, not
their attorneys, should make major litigation decisions.64 Shareholder litigation
is an exception to this principle because these lawsuits are not controlled by the
real parties in interest. Instead, these suits are controlled by a shareholder
62
See Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & A. C. Pritchard, The Price of Pay to
Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650, 651 (2011) (“The political
influence over these funds raises the question of whether law firms are making campaign
contributions to politicians to enhance their chances of being selected to represent the
funds.”).
63
See id. (“State pension funds whose managers have received campaign contributions . . .
appear to be less vigorous in negotiating attorney fees.”); see also Drew T. Johnson-Skinner,
Paying-to-Play in Securities Class Actions: A Look at Lawyers’ Campaign Contributions, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1725, 1750 (2009) (“[D]ata confirms that plaintiff’s law firms are contributing
to the pension funds that select them as counsel.”).
64
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677 (1986) (“In theory, a fundamental premise of American legal ethics
is that clients, not their attorneys, should define litigation objectives.”).
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representative, who acts on behalf of the shareholder class in merger and
securities class actions and on behalf of the plaintiff corporation in a derivative
suit.65 The representative nature of these suits means that the real parties in
interest are not directly involved in the litigation and are therefore limited in
their ability to monitor it.
Corporate law attempts to solve this problem by entrusting shareholder
plaintiffs to monitor the lawsuits on behalf of the larger shareholder class.66 Yet
these shareholders often do not own a large enough stake in the corporation to
justify the costs of closely monitoring the litigation.67 A shareholder with only
one hundred dollars at stake in the litigation will not take the time to delve into
the details to ensure that the attorneys are acting in the best interests of the class.
This reduced monitoring impacts shareholder lawsuits in two related ways.
First, on the front end, attorneys can file lawsuits that may not be in their clients’
best interests.68 These lawsuits may be financially lucrative for the plaintiffs’
attorneys, even though they do not ultimately benefit the shareholders or the
plaintiff corporation. Second, on the back end, if shareholders are not monitoring
the litigation, it opens the door for attorneys to seek a higher fee.69 Plaintiffs’
attorneys may be able to structure a settlement that maximizes their return, even
if it does not maximize the return to shareholders.
These agency costs explain many of the problems described above, starting
with the prevalence of nonmonetary settlements in merger and derivative suits.
Shareholders receive little benefit from these settlements, as empirical studies
have documented,70 yet they are remarkably lucrative for plaintiffs’ attorneys,

65
In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 117 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“A
shareholder plaintiff in a derivative suit alleges claims in the right of the corporation rather
than directly . . . .”); In re Countrywide Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 3464-VCN, 2009 WL
846019, at *13-15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2009) (presenting framework to ensure that the
shareholder plaintiff is an adequate representative of shareholder class in a merger class
action).
66
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 49 (1985).
67
See id.
68
See Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 20-21.
69
Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and
Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 389 (1994) (arguing that interests of
shareholder plaintiffs and their attorneys “may conflict since the fee award comes out of the
damage recovery so that any increase in the fee award necessarily leads to a decrease in
plaintiffs’ recovery”).
70
See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1830 (“As my study reveals, . . . shareholders agree to
settle shareholder derivative suits in exchange for corporate governance reforms that are often
untested and/or patently unhelpful for both the corporations and their sharholders.”); Romano,
supra note 3, at 63 (“While it is impossible to value the benefits from structural settlements
with any precision, the gains seem inconsequential.”).
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with six-figure fee awards as the norm.71 The financial incentives favor these
types of settlements because plaintiffs’ attorneys profit from them and
shareholder plaintiffs do not have enough of a financial stake in the litigation to
make it worth their while to protest.
Agency costs also help explain the pervasiveness of other types of nuisance
settlements. Low-dollar settlements, which are seen in a sizable minority of
securities class actions, benefit plaintiffs’ attorneys, often at the expense of their
shareholder clients. As many scholars have explained, shareholders are harmed
by nuisance settlements because they often remain an investor in the target
corporation. As a result, any money they receive in the settlement comes out of
their investment in the corporation, creating a circularity problem that has been
well documented in corporate scholarship.72 If these suits deter future
misconduct by corporate managers, the suits may benefit shareholders despite
this circularity, but meritless claims have little, if any, deterrent effect.73 As a
result, suits that are filed for their nuisance value benefit attorneys, but they are
unlikely to benefit shareholders. As Professor John Coffee, Jr. stated, the
dynamic of “high agency costs make plaintiff’s attorneys independent
entrepreneurs.”74
Agency costs, however, are only one piece of the puzzle. They explain why
shareholder representatives do not closely monitor these cases, but not why
defendants agree to settle them. As we will see, cost asymmetries fill in this part
of the story.
2.

Cost Asymmetries

The legal system provides multiple opportunities for defendants to contest
meritless claims, from motions to dismiss, to summary judgment, and to trial.75
These opportunities only work, however, if the parties face the right economic

71

See KOUMRIAN, supra note 37, at 3 (reporting average fee request of $500,000 in merger
cases in 2013 ending in disclosure-only settlements); Erickson, supra note 3, at 1806 (finding
$460,000 is median fee award in derivative suits ending with corporate governance
settlement).
72
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006) (describing “a
basic circularity underlying the securities class action: When damages are imposed on the
corporation, they essentially fall on diversified shareholders, thereby producing mainly
pocket-shifting wealth transfers among shareholders”); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the
Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 334 (describing
circularity problem as “private securities litigation [being] socially wasteful because it merely
transfers funds from one set of shareholders to another”).
73
See Coffee, Jr., supra note 72, at 1535-36 (“As presently constituted, securities class
actions produce wealth transfers among shareholders that neither compensate nor deter.”).
74
See Coffee, Jr., supra note 64, at 724.
75
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 56 (permitting defendant to submit motion to dismiss and
motion for summary judgment in civil proceedings).
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incentives. In the typical civil lawsuit, the parties face roughly equivalent costs
and therefore roughly equivalent incentives to litigate.76 In shareholder
litigation, however, the defendants’ costs are typically far greater than the
plaintiffs’ costs, creating a cost asymmetry between the two sides of the
litigation.77 It costs relatively little for attorneys to file many of these cases. The
complaints tend to be fairly similar, and they are often filed within hours of the
merger announcement.78 Additionally, almost all discovery material is in the
hands of the defendants.79
Given that each side pays its own discovery costs, this disparity means that
the corporation’s costs are significantly higher than the plaintiffs’ costs. As a
result, even if a corporation does not think that the suit has merit, it will rationally
pay to settle the case rather than incur the high costs of discovery. Indeed, as one
New York judge recently stated, “No one, not even plaintiffs, disputes this
reality [that] [t]he defendant corporation’s cost-benefit calculus almost always
leads the company to settle.”80
Reinforcing these incentives is the fact that many of these cases pose
significant downside risks to defendants that are not commensurate with the
risks felt by plaintiffs. In merger litigation, for example, the plaintiff will often
seek to enjoin the merger, which would create significant costs for the defendant
corporation.81 Potential damages in securities class actions can easily rise to
hundreds of millions of dollars, which means that these suits can become “bet
76

See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 9, at 1-2 (“For the closed cases included in the sample,
the median cost, including attorney fees, was $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for
defendants.”).
77
See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 8, at 71-72, 75-76 (discussing cost asymmetries in merger
and securities class actions); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The
Importance of Being Dismissive: The Efficiency Role of Pleading Stage Evaluation of
Shareholder Litigation, 42 J. CORP. L. 597, 602-03 (2017) (explaining that “the one-sided
threat of unchecked discovery costs becomes a source of leverage for extracting settlement
payments without regard to the merits of the litigation” (footnote omitted)).
78
See, e.g., Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the
Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 155 (2011) (discussing how
plaintiffs’ attorneys “quickly file cookie-cutter complaints”).
79
See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 8, at 71-72, 75-76 (“[W]hile the plaintiff may only have
to locate a few pages from his investment records, the defendant will have to spend millions
of dollars to conduct a sweeping search of its own documents.”).
80
See City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 651668/2014, 2015 WL 93894, at *14 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Jan. 7, 2015), rev’d, 43 N.Y.S.3d 21 (2016).
81
See William Savitt, Leave Merger Disclosure Litigation Where It Belongs, 93 TEX. L.
REV. SEE ALSO 173, 177 (2015) (“Disclosure claims thus offer shareholder plaintiffs a route
to seek expedited discovery and a preliminary injunction to block the deal, both of which can
in turn create leverage to force a settlement.”); see also In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig.,
129 A.3d 884, 892 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“In [merger] lawsuits, plaintiffs’ leverage is the threat of
an injunction to prevent a transaction from closing. Faced with that threat, defendants are
incentivized to settle quickly in order to mitigate the considerable expense of litigation and
the distraction it entails . . . .”).
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the company” lawsuits.82 In such low-probability suits involving the potential
for large verdicts, defendants are often risk-averse.83 As a result, they are often
willing to settle meritless claims to avoid delaying an important transaction or
risking the company’s financial stability.84
Nonmonetary settlements are an easy way for defendants to avoid these
financial risks. Most settlements outside of corporate law are zero-sum85—every
dollar that the plaintiff recovers comes out of the defendant’s pocket.86 As a
result, defendants have an incentive to fight claims they think they can win.
Nonmonetary settlements change this analysis. If the defendant can get rid of
the case by offering nonmonetary relief, such as additional disclosures about a
merger or modest corporate governance reforms, then it has a reduced incentive
to fight meritless claims.87 The same calculus exists in securities class actions,
albeit in a slightly different way. In these cases, defendants often do not have the
option of nonmonetary settlements, but they can still enter into a monetary
settlement at a fairly low cost. Across the board, therefore, defendants make the
rational cost-benefit calculation that it is cheaper to settle the case and pay the
plaintiff’s fees than go through discovery and then get the case dismissed.
Defendants are not necessarily victims in this narrative. In shareholder
lawsuits, defendants walk away with a release from liability at a bargain price.
Settlements are a negotiation in which plaintiffs get money or other
consideration and defendants get a binding promise that they will not face
liability in a related suit in the future. In settlements involving nonmonetary or
82
See Charles Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities
Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 588 (2000) (“When it comes to securities class action
litigation, there are substantial reasons to believe that defendants are strongly risk-averse,
pessimistic, and have asymmetric stakes. It should not be surprising, therefore, that they will
seek to settle even cases that they view as having only a small chance of success.”); see also
Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Many corporate
executives are unwilling to bet their company that they are in the right in big-stakes litigation,
and a grant of class status can propel the stakes of a case into the stratosphere.”).
83
See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 163, 168 (2000) (explaining theory that defendants will be risk-averse with
respect to low probability losses, while plaintiffs will be risk-seeking in same context); Mark
Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 696-97 (2011) (stating that “many claim
defendants are more risk averse than plaintiffs, particularly in low probability suits” and “[i]f
true, even the small threat of a very large jury verdict, particularly in class cases, may lead
defendants to settle weak class claims for more than they are objectively worth”).
84
See Moller, supra note 83, at 697.
85
Congress has eliminated non-monetary settlements in many other areas of law. See, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012) (eliminating coupon settlements).
86
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 652 (1976) (“Furthermore, when the purpose of
negotiation is dispute-settlement, the process tends to be a zero-sum game (that is, a contest
in which the winner’s gains are exactly balanced by the loser’s losses).”).
87
See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 66, at 25 (“Normally, in litigation, the winning side’s
recovery equals the losing side’s losses, much as in poker. But in [a non-monetary settlement],
an absent third party, the corporation, bears the expenses of both sides.”).
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other inconsequential relief, the defendants’ release from liability may be far
more valuable than anything they agree to give the plaintiffs. As a result, the
typical pattern in these suits—a hastily-filed complaint, minimal investigation
by the plaintiff’s attorney, and a nonmonetary settlement—benefits the lawyers
on both sides of the suit, as well as the defendants. The only group that does not
benefit is shareholders, who both pay for the litigation and give up any later right
to sue if they discover a problem with the underlying transaction or disclosures
in the future.
Together, these points present a bleak image of shareholder litigation. Merger
and derivative suits rarely return meaningful value to shareholders. Securities
class actions have a better batting average, but the PSLRA has created a
substantial risk that many good cases are never filed, while some meritless cases
still escape scrutiny. These outcomes are a direct result of agency costs and cost
asymmetries. Shareholder plaintiffs are supposed to monitor their attorneys to
ensure that these cases are litigated in the best interests of shareholders, but they
often own too little stock to perform this monitoring function effectively. And
corporations and their managers, who should be defending against these claims,
find it cheaper to enter into low-value settlements and get broad releases. As a
result, these suits do not perform a critical role in policing corporate managers.
II.

THE PROMISE OF PROCEDURE

The field of civil procedure offers a solution to the longstanding problems in
shareholder litigation. This Part first explores why procedure is the right
solution, before discussing specific procedures to address the problems
introduced in Part I. As discussed below, together these procedures have the
potential to revive the promise of shareholder litigation. This analysis sets the
stage for an examination in Part III as to why institutional shareholders are the
right group to take the lead in adopting these new procedural reforms.
A.

Why Procedure?

When it comes to litigation reform, lawmakers have different tools at their
disposal. They can reform the substantive law, the procedures that govern this
substantive law, or the remedies available to plaintiffs. This Section addresses
why procedural reform is the right solution to the specific problems in corporate
litigation. It then addresses how including new procedures in corporate bylaws
or charters would have the unappreciated benefit of making these procedures
portable, which would help address the multijurisdictional challenges in these
suits.
1.

Procedure Versus Substance

It is not immediately obvious why corporations should turn to procedure.
Maybe instead of focusing on procedural reform, investors should rewrite the
substantive rules that apply in these cases. They could, for example, make the
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business judgment rule even more stringent. Or they could make it more difficult
for shareholders to prevail in claims alleging waste or lack of oversight.
The problem with this approach is that the substantive law already makes it
extremely difficult to bring fiduciary duty and securities claims. It is nearly
impossible to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule—the bedrock
of substantive fiduciary duty law.88 It is harder still to prove a claim that the
board did not exercise proper oversight over the corporation or engage in
corporate waste.89 Even self-dealing claims, which are typically reviewed under
the more stringent entire fairness standard, rarely succeed.
The problem in corporate law, in other words, is not that the substantive law
is too lax. The problem is that these claims are profitable even though they are
unlikely to succeed.90 Changing the substantive law will not solve these
problems. Most defendants would win under the existing substantive law, if they
chose to fight the claims. Nevertheless, they choose to settle, rather than take
these cases to trial, because agency costs and cost asymmetries make it
unprofitable to defend against these claims, even if they believe they would win.
Making the law more stringent would not change this calculus. Instead of
tougher substantive laws, the legal system needs a better way to sort the good
cases from the bad. Such sorting is exactly what procedural rules are supposed
to do.91 Procedure sorts cases at all stages of the litigation process, from motions
to dismiss to motions for class certification and summary judgment.
Yet traditional procedural rules are inadequate for the unique problems in
shareholder litigation. Procedure is typically transsubstantive, which means that
the same procedural rules apply in all civil cases.92 Most cases, however, do not
suffer from the agency costs and cost asymmetries that cause such problems in
shareholder litigation. In a typical civil case, the plaintiff receives the lion’s
share of any recovery, which gives the plaintiff a strong economic interest to
monitor her attorney. In addition, most cases involve discovery costs that are
88

Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (describing business
judgment rule as “powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the directors”).
89
Cf. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(describing an oversight claim as “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment”).
90
See supra Section I.B (discussing economics of claims that are unlikely to actually
prevail but nonetheless lead to monetary settlement).
91
See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 577 (1997)
(“The goal of any regulatory scheme, whether it involves strict pleading, penalties or judicial
screening, is, loosely stated, to minimize the problems of frivolous litigation without creating
too many new problems along the way.”); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second
Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1990) (discussing “screening
function” of summary judgment rules).
92
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil
Procedure, 23 Cᴀʀᴅᴏᴢᴏ L. Rᴇᴠ. 1865, 1888 (2002) (describing transsubstantive procedural
rules as “deliberate design choices that lie at the core of the achievement of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure”).
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relatively minor and fall equally on both sides.93 In other words, transsubstantive
procedural rules do little to address agency costs and cost asymmetries because
these problems are not present in any significant way in most civil cases.
Shareholder litigation is different, for all of the reasons set out in Part I. As a
result, it makes sense to have special procedural rules that apply in this special
category of cases.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that procedure is not an entirely new
solution to the problems in shareholder litigation. Prior reform efforts by states
and legal reform groups have also proposed procedural changes. In shareholder
derivative suits in particular, states impose a demand requirement on
shareholders prior to filing suit,94 and they have created a complex set of rules
permitting plaintiff corporations to form a special litigation committee that can
move to dismiss a derivative suit.95 Some states also impose a bond requirement
on shareholders seeking to file a derivative suit.96 The American Law Institute
similarly spent years debating the appropriate procedural rules to apply in these
cases, ultimately recommending a universal demand requirement along with
other procedural hurdles.97
These procedures, however, were not designed to address the specific
problems—agency costs and cost asymmetries—in shareholder litigation.
Instead, they were primarily designed to give corporate boards more influence
over these suits. For the reasons discussed below in Part III, this approach has
been unsuccessful as a screening mechanism because corporate boards have a
structural bias that prevents them from impartially reviewing such claims.98
Bond requirements are similarly undesirable because they make it more difficult
for all plaintiffs to file these claims, regardless of the underlying merits of the

93
Multiple studies have found that the cost of discovery in most cases is fairly minimal.
For example, a study by the Federal Judicial Center found that the median discovery costs for
plaintiffs were $15,000, while the median discovery costs for defendants in these same cases
were $20,000. These costs are far lower than the lore that dominates policy debates would
suggest. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 9, at 1-2.
94
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(A); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. Ch. 1984)
(“[D]emand can only be excused where facts are alleged with particularity which create a
reasonable doubt that the directors’ action was entitled to the protections of the business
judgment rule.”).
95
See 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8:25 (AM. BAR FOUND. Supp. 2002).
96
See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2011).
97
See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative
Litigation: The Ali Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1341-42 (1993) (“Since 1978, the
Corporate Governance Project of the American Law Institute (‘ALI’)—sometimes called the
most elite group of lawyers in the United States—has labored over finding the appropriate
balance between management and shareholder rights in derivative suits.”).
98
See infra Section II.B.3; see also 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.02(c)
(AM. LAW INST. 1994) (emphasizing that there is a consistent pattern among special litigation
committees of dismissing the action as to all defendants).
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claims.99 The legal system cannot indiscriminately throw new procedures at the
specific problems in this area of law. Instead, legal reformers must step back and
analyze the suite of procedural options more systematically to identify those that
can more effectively address the specific challenges of shareholder lawsuits.
Before doing so, however, it is necessary first to analyze where these new
procedures will be included, a point that will impact the effectiveness of any
new procedures.
2.

The Benefits of Portable Procedure

When thinking about procedural reform, one may typically think about new
rules adopted by legislatures or judges. Yet plenty of procedural reform happens
through private ordering. The rise of arbitration, for example, occurred because
contracting parties included arbitration clauses in their agreements. Contracting
parties also routinely agree to change how they will pay for any future litigation
expenses. And they can agree to waive their right to appeal,100 their right to a
jury trial,101 and their right to file a class action.102 In other words, the procedural
rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are often only default rules that
parties are free to change through private agreement.
Procedural private ordering, however, has been slow to come to corporate
law. In 2010, the Delaware Court of Chancery first opened the door, albeit in a
limited way. The court invited corporations that were concerned about litigating
in multiple jurisdictions to include a forum selection provision in their governing
documents.103 Following this invitation, several hundred companies adopted

99

See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem, 100
VA. L. REV. 261, 311 n.244 (2014) (“This bonding requirement is much less common today—
as judges came to believe that it would smother derivative claims. The cost of posting the
bond, even before it is combined with the risk that the money might be lost, can be greater
than the expected recovery to a small shareholder-claimant.”).
100
See 2 AM. JUR. APPEAL AND ERROR § 204 (2010) (“Though there are a few cases to the
contrary, the rule prevailing in the great majority of the jurisdictions is that an [appellate
waiver] is valid and binding, and, when properly pleaded, will constitute a bar to proceedings
taken in violation of the agreement.”).
101
See, e.g., RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002)
(“Although the right of trial by jury in civil actions is protected by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution, that right, like other constitutional rights, may be waived by prior written
agreement of the parties.”).
102
See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act does not permit states to prohibit class action waivers in arbitration
contracts).
103
In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with
charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”).
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forum selection provisions in their bylaws.104 A smaller number of corporations
adopted other procedural rules, but this trend is limited. It does show, however,
that procedural reform in the corporate arena does not have to happen through
formal, legislative action. Instead, it can occur on a company-by-company basis
through amendments to corporate charters or bylaws.105
This point matters because including new procedures in corporate charters or
bylaws has the unappreciated benefit of making these procedures portable. To
understand this point, one must understand the multijurisdictional nature of
shareholder litigation. In January 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery stated
that it would look far more closely at disclosure-only settlements, rejecting those
that do not involve “plainly material” disclosures.106 Over the following year,
the total number of merger cases across the country fell slightly,107 but a sizable
percentage of the remaining cases moved outside of Delaware. In 2016, thirtyfour percent of merger cases were filed in Delaware; in 2017, that percentage
dropped to nine percent.108 In short, Delaware tried to crack down on these cases,
but as a result, it lost most of them.109 Past reform efforts have shown the
portable nature of these claims to be one of the biggest challenges in reforming
shareholder litigation.
This observation reveals the drawbacks of including new procedures in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the state equivalents. Under the internal
affairs doctrine,110 if a state adopts new substantive reforms to the law governing
shareholder litigation, these reforms apply to all cases involving corporations
incorporated in that state, regardless of where the case is filed.111 If, however, a
state adopts new procedural reforms, such as greater scrutiny of settlements or
heightened pleading requirements, these reforms do not apply in cases filed
104

See Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum
Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 33 (2015) (finding that, as of
August 2014, 746 public companies had adopted these provisions).
105
See infra notes 140-141.
106
See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016).
107
See Cain et al., supra note 53, at 608 (“In 2013, 91% of all completed deals were
challenged in at least one lawsuit. That number declined to 73% in 2016 but rose to 85% in
2017.”).
108
See id.
109
See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation
in M&A Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1925, 1939 (2013) (“Weaker cases, however, are more
likely to go elsewhere [outside of Delaware], in an effort to find a more hospitable home.”).
110
See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982) (discussing modern internal
affairs doctrine).
111
See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, The Reach of State Corporate Law Beyond State Borders:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1159 (2009) (“Extraterritoriality is an
unavoidable consequence of the internal affairs doctrine.”); Verity Winship, Aligning Law
and Forum: The Home Court Advantage, 81 TENN. L. REV. 1, 14, 22-23 (2013) (arguing that
Erie “unbundles” state law and state forum and “dictates the use of substantive state law in
diversity cases”).
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outside the jurisdiction.112 In other words, fiduciary duties travel outside the
state’s boundaries, while settlement rules and pleading requirements do not.
As a result, although Delaware has announced that it will review disclosureonly settlements more stringently, courts in other states are free to apply their
own standards, even if the case involves corporations incorporated in
Delaware.113 State choice-of-law rules accordingly allow plaintiffs’ attorneys to
forum shop for more favorable procedural rules,114 seeking out courts that will
use less scrutiny in reviewing their proposed settlements. These doctrines,
however, do not apply to procedures included in corporate charters and bylaws.
Parties are generally free to agree that different rules will govern their dispute,115
and by and large, these agreements will trump a jurisdiction’s own procedural
rules.116 When shareholders or board members adopt new rules to govern their
disputes, these rules become the law in any future shareholder lawsuit.117 In sum,
by including procedural rules in their charters or bylaws, corporations can make
procedure portable.
This portability could prove pivotal in the struggle over shareholder litigation.
By including new procedural rules in their governing documents, corporations
can prevent plaintiffs’ attorneys from forum shopping for more favorable
procedures. Given that the substantive law in fiduciary duty cases is almost
always the law of the state of incorporation, plaintiffs’ attorneys would face the
112
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1971)
(“[A] court under traditional and prevailing practice will apply its own state’s rules involving
process, pleadings, joinder of parties, and the administration of the trial . . . .”).
113
Several courts have declined to follow Trulia, applying their own state-specific
standards for reviewing proposed settlements. See, e.g., Murphy v. Synergetics USA Inc., No.
1511-CC00778 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2016) (approving disclosure-only settlement); In re
Sigma-Aldrich Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 1422-CC09684 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2015)
(same); Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557, 566 (App. Div. 2017) (holding
that New York courts will apply New York law to review settlements in merger class actions,
rather than Trulia standard from Delaware).
114
When it comes to choice-of-law rules regarding substantive law, the internal affairs
doctrine dictates that courts should apply the law of the state of incorporation. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“[T]he
local law of the state of incorporation should be applied except in the extremely rare situation
where a contrary result is required by the overriding interest of another state in having its rule
applied.”).
115
See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 949, 951 (1994) (“Widespread approval by courts of party autonomy rules has
made it more possible for commercial parties to avoid choice of law confusion.”).
116
See Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 643, 672 (2015) (“Many of the normal rules of procedure thus become no more
than default contractual rules, which the parties can extensively modify through
negotiation.”).
117
As discussed in Section III.C, infra, the law is not entirely clear regarding the limits of
procedural innovations in charters and bylaws. Yet the likely interpretation of the law is that
shareholders have tremendous flexibility to craft their own procedural rules just like they can
create their own substantive rules.
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same substantive and procedural rules regardless of where they file. This
consistency would reduce the incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to forum shop,
thus providing more effective means for corporations to address the agency costs
and cost asymmetries in these cases.
B.

A New Procedural Toolkit

There is no single procedure that will solve all of the problems with
shareholder litigation. The field of civil procedure, however, does offer specific
tools designed to reduce agency costs and cost asymmetries. This Section
outlines procedural changes in shareholder litigation that could target both
problems. Viewed as a whole, these proposals aim to help sort the good cases
from the bad, ensuring that meritless cases are dismissed while meritorious cases
continue.
1.

Tools to Control Agency Costs

As discussed in Part I, many of the problems in shareholder litigation are
caused by agency costs. Shareholders’ interests are not aligned with the interests
of their attorneys, and most shareholder plaintiffs do not have a large enough
stake in the case to ensure that the attorneys are putting the shareholders’
interests above their own. As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys can file cases and
enter into settlements that do not benefit their shareholder clients. This Section
discusses three procedural tools that can help address these agency costs:
nonwaivable forum selection clauses, bans on nonmonetary settlements, and
enhanced standing requirements.
a. Nonwaivable Forum Selection Clauses
Shareholders should consider incorporating forum selection clauses into
corporate bylaws, specifying the forum in which future shareholder lawsuits
must be litigated.118 These clauses help address agency costs in two ways. First,
they curb multijurisdictional litigation and the problems that go along with it.
As noted above, over the last several years, plaintiffs’ law firms have
increasingly filed parallel claims in multiple jurisdictions.119 These
multijurisdictional suits allow defendants to hold a reverse auction among the
various plaintiffs’ attorneys to get the cheapest settlement price.120 Defense
118

Delaware specifically amended its corporate code to permit these clauses, as long as
the forum is Delaware. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2019) (“The certificate of
incorporation or the bylaws may require . . . that any or all internal corporate claims shall be
brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State . . . .”).
119
See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 16, at 5 (“Merger claims can be brought in three places:
in the state of incorporation, in the headquarters state, or in federal court.”).
120
See Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
467, 507 (“The most threatening consequence of multi-forum shareholder litigation is that it
inhibits the ability of any plaintiff’s attorney to press for a tough bargain in settlement.”);
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counsel can offer low settlement terms to an attorney in one jurisdiction with the
implicit threat that if the attorney does not accept the terms, the defendant will
settle with another attorney who will.121 Even if the first attorney thinks that the
case is worth more than the settlement offer, it may well accept the settlement
to avoid losing the lion’s share of the attorneys’ fees, which typically go to the
firm that oversees the settlement. The defendant can then use the settlement as
res judicata to dismiss parallel cases pending in other jurisdictions.122 Forum
selection clauses have the potential to halt these efforts by bringing all litigation
into a single forum.123
Second, if shareholders choose the right forum, forum selection clauses
should funnel the claims into a forum such as Delaware that is likely to provide
greater oversight over these claims. As corporations experienced, as soon as one
jurisdiction starts to crack down on shareholder suits, these suits move to a
different jurisdiction where the judges are less likely to closely monitor them.124
Forum selection clauses prohibit this type of forum shopping, allowing courts
that want to crack down on litigation abuses to do so without worrying about
driving the cases away.
Unlike many of the other procedural reforms suggested in this Article, forum
selection clauses are already on their way to becoming a procedural staple in
corporate law. First proposed by the Delaware Court of Chancery in 2010, they
are now commonplace, especially among corporations announcing a large
merger or acquisition. These clauses, however, are typically adopted by boards
of directors and give boards broad discretion to waive the clause.125 In theory,
this discretion makes sense. While a corporation may generally want its
shareholders’ suits to be litigated in a given jurisdiction, there may be times
when it makes more sense for these suits to be litigated elsewhere.
In practice, however, the mere possibility of waiver undercuts the
effectiveness of these clauses. Once a company is sued, it has to decide whether
to enforce the forum selection clause and fight the claims in its chosen forum
(likely Delaware, where the claims will be closely scrutinized by the court) or
simply enter into a cheap settlement and get rid of the claims. A rational
company could easily decide that it is cheaper to go with the latter option, and
Morris A. Ratner, Class Conflicts, 92 WASH. L. REV. 785, 799 (2017) (“Reverse auctions
occurred when defendants pitted competing camps of plaintiffs’ counsel against each other,
awarding the role of settlement class counsel to the lowest bidder.”).
121
See Thomas, supra note 109, at 1936 (“Defendants may run a reverse auction, in which
competing plaintiffs’ counsel offer to settle their suits at the lowest price.”).
122
See Myers, supra note 120, at 507 (“[A] settlement with the plaintiff’s attorney in one
forum generally precludes the claims asserted in another forum.”).
123
See Ratner, supra note 120, at 854-55 (explaining how “the likelihood of reverse
auctions in mass torts has been substantially reduced” as a result of procedures bringing these
cases into a single jurisdiction with a clear leadership structure).
124
See supra Section II.A.2.
125
See Romano & Sanga, supra note 104, at 35.
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plaintiffs’ firms deciding whether to sue know this. As a result, the possibility
of waiver revives the incentives to file meritless claims. Shareholders crafting
these clauses should therefore consider eliminating the broad discretion that
boards currently have to waive these clauses.
Even with this change, however, forum selection clauses cannot solve the
problems in shareholder litigation on their own. These clauses only prevent
forum shopping in shareholder lawsuits filed under state law. They cannot
control shareholder lawsuits filed under federal law because federal law provides
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over these suits. Increasingly, as
state courts have cracked down on merger cases, law firms have started to
package their allegations as securities class actions instead, avoiding state courts
altogether.126 As a result, forum selection clauses are an important tool in the
procedural toolbox, but they cannot fix the problems in these suits by
themselves.
b. Bans on Nonmonetary Settlements
An additional option to control agency costs in shareholder litigation is to ban
nonmonetary settlements. As discussed in Part I, both derivative suits and
merger suits frequently end with settlements in which the shareholders and/or
the plaintiff corporation receive no money or other financial consideration.
Instead, in derivative suits, the plaintiff corporation often agrees to make minor
changes to its corporate governance practices, while in merger cases, the
defendant corporation agrees to make additional disclosures about the merger.
Empirical evidence suggests that such nonmonetary consideration offers little
benefit for shareholders.127
One option then is for shareholders to prohibit corporations from entering into
these settlements. Similarly, as Professor Sean Griffith recently suggested,
shareholders could prohibit the corporation from paying the plaintiffs’ attorneys
fees in these settlements.128 As Griffith notes, a corporation faces different
incentives before and after it is sued.129 After a corporation is sued, it makes
economic sense for the corporation to agree to a nonmonetary settlement. These
126
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2017 MIDYEAR
ASSESSMENT 3 (2017), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-ClassAction-Filings-2017-Midyear-Assessment [https://perma.cc/2P46-4ZDC] (“The Delaware
Court of Chancery’s rejection of a disclosure-only settlement in Trulia in January 2016 seems
to have caused a shift of merger objection lawsuits from state to federal court.”).
127
See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1755 (“[C]orporate governance settlements often fail to
live up to their potential because they include reforms that are unlikely to benefit corporations
or their shareholders.”); Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 561 (finding that
“disclosure-only settlements do not appear to affect shareholder voting in any way”).
128
See Griffith, supra note 16, at 1 (detailing benefits of “No Pay” provisions in
corporations’ charters or bylaws).
129
Id. at 14 (describing “disconnect in defense side incentives ex ante and ex post” in
context of forum selection provisions).
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settlements are cheap for the corporation, at least compared to defending against
the claims. Before the corporation has been sued, however, a corporation is
better off surrendering this settlement option, because doing so will reduce the
likelihood that the corporation will be sued in the first place.130
The ex post incentives make corporations easy targets because plaintiffs’
attorneys know that it is cheaper for them to settle the claims with non-monetary
settlements than to litigate the claims. If this option is off the table, and the
corporation has to pay actual money to settle the suit, it may well decide to fight
instead, reducing the incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to sue the company in
the first instance. In short, ex post corporations want to enter into nonmonetary
settlements, but ex ante, the same corporations may well rationally surrender
their right to do so.
Although Griffith’s proposal focuses on merger litigation, shareholders could
extend it to derivative suits as well. Just as in merger suits, corporations agree to
nonmonetary settlements in derivative suits because these settlements are a
relatively inexpensive way to get rid of individual suits. If this option were off
the table, however, corporations would have to decide whether to demand
money from the defendants or go to trial. To the extent that some corporations
would choose to fight frivolous claims rather than settle them, it should reduce
the incentive to file these claims.
As with forum selection clauses, this proposal is unlikely to completely solve
the agency cost problems in shareholder litigation. Nonmonetary settlements are
not common in securities class actions,131 and yet there are still nuisance
settlements in these cases. As discussed in Part I, nearly twenty percent of
settlements in securities class actions are for less than two million dollars, a
commonly used cutoff for nuisance settlements in this area.132 A similar outcome
is possible in derivative and merger suits if corporations collectively refuse to
enter into non-monetary settlements. Although these cases are cheaper to litigate
than securities class actions, the litigation costs will likely still exceed a million
dollars, and many corporations would therefore be willing to pay less than this
amount to settle the claims. Even without nonmonetary settlement options, in
other words, parties could likely still find ways to settle nuisance claims
relatively cheaply. As a result, banning nonmonetary settlements is best viewed
as part of a larger shareholder effort to reform shareholder litigation.

130

See id. (“But ex post, once the corporation has become a defendant in merger litigation,
that corporation has a strong incentive to buy the broad, cheap releases that disclosure
settlements provide.”).
131
LAARNI T. BULAN, ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENTS: 2016 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2017), http://securities.stanford.edu/researchreports/1996-2016/Settlements-Through-12-2016-Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E6ANKV2W] (showing that from 1996 to 2016, the minimum settlement in securites class action
case was approximately $100,000).
132
See BULAN, RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 54, at 5.
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c. New Standing Requirements
As a more radical option, shareholders could adopt enhanced standing
requirements to reduce the agency costs in shareholder litigation. The legal
system currently imposes minimal standing requirements on shareholders
seeking to file representative lawsuits. In shareholder derivative suits,
representative shareholders must own stock at the time of the alleged
misconduct133 and hold this stock throughout the litigation.134 In securities class
actions, the plaintiff must have purchased or sold the corporation’s securities
during the class period.135 And in all shareholder lawsuits, the lead plaintiff must
be an “adequate” representative,136 although this standard typically requires very
little.137
What the law does not require, however, is that the representative shareholder
own a minimum amount of the corporation’s stock. At least in theory, a
shareholder who owns just a single share of stock in the target corporation can
challenge a merger or take a corporation to court for allegedly lying to its
investors.138 This permissive approach to standing exacerbates the agency costs
outlined above. The less of a stake that a shareholder has in the target company,
the less time and expense the shareholder will be willing to invest in monitoring
his or her attorney.
Investors could change the standing rules in shareholder lawsuits. Rather than
allowing any shareholder to embroil the company in litigation, no matter how
small the shareholder’s holdings or how little the shareholder’s damages, a
133

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2019).
See Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 1984) (“A plaintiff who ceases to
be a shareholder, whether by reason of a merger or for any other reason, loses standing to
continue a derivative suit.”).
135
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975) (holding that
plaintiffs lacked standing because they were neither “‘purchasers’ nor ‘sellers’”).
136
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that “representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class”).
137
See Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1176
(2009) (stating that the adequacy requirement “is fairly minimal––a modest and elementary
principle of justice rather than an extraordinary and heroic burden”).
138
This does not mean that the amount of stock a shareholder owns is irrelevant in the
litigation. The PSLRA includes a rebuttable presumption that the shareholder applicant with
the largest financial interest should be the lead plaintiff in the suit. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–
4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2012). State law also makes a shareholder’s holdings an important
factor in choosing a lead plaintiff. See Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., LLC, No. 19575,
2002 WL 1558342, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002) (identifying as a factor in determining the
lead plaintiff “the relative economic stakes of the competing litigants in the outcome of the
lawsuit (to be accorded ‘great weight’)”). Under either approach, however, the amount of the
plaintiff’s stock holdings is only a factor when it comes to choosing among those shareholders
vying to be lead plaintiff. There is no amount of stock that a shareholder is required to own to
file the lawsuit, and if there are no other shareholders seeking to serve as lead plaintiff, the
sole applicant is typically appointed automatically.
134
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company’s bylaws could provide for minimum ownership and/or damage
requirements. A handful of companies have already made this change. For
example, Emergent Capital, Inc. amended its bylaws to prohibit shareholders
from filing a class action or derivative suit against the corporation, its directors,
or its officers unless the shareholder owns at least three percent of the
corporation’s stock.139 This bylaw was approved by both Emergent’s board and
its shareholders.140 In adopting the bylaw, Emergent’s Chairman stated that “we
strongly believe this is a very good bylaw that deters such suits without unduly
impeding meritorious representative lawsuits.”141
The three percent requirement is likely higher than most companies would
want, although the optimal level of holdings or damages will vary depending on
the size of the corporation and its concentration of ownership. In smaller
corporations with relatively concentrated stock holdings, shareholders might
choose to allow only those who own more than one or two percent of the
corporation’s stock to file suit. In larger corporations with less concentrated
stock ownership, it might make more sense to use a monetary threshold (i.e., one
hundred thousand dollars) because there might not be many shareholders who
own a significant percentage of the corporation’s stock. With either type of
company, the objective should be to set the requirements high enough that only
shareholders with the financial incentives to monitor the case can serve as
representative plaintiffs, while still ensuring that there is an ample supply of
potential plaintiffs among the corporation’s shareholders.142
The adoption of minimum ownership requirements in shareholder litigation
would be consistent with the approach used in other areas of corporate and
securities law. Individual shareholders with only a single share of stock have
little power to act on their own. To submit a shareholder proposal, for example,
a shareholder must own at least two thousand dollars worth of stock in the
corporation or one percent of the corporation’s outstanding stock.143 In addition,
139

See Michael P. Matthews et al., Shareholder Suit Challenging Groundbreaking
Minimum-Support-to-Sue Bylaw Dismissed, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.foley.com/shareholder-suit-challenging-groundbreaking-minimum-support-tosue-bylaw-dismissed-10-19-2015/.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
For this reason, standing requirements should not permit the aggregation of claims. If
aggregation was permitted, a corporation with a minimum standing requirement of one
hundred thousand dollars could be sued by a collection of one hundred shareholders each
owning one hundred dollars worth of stock in the corporation. As scholars note in the
securities class action context, such bundling undercuts the goal of having individual investors
with the financial incentive to monitor their attorney. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation,
Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 54 (2001) (noting concerns regarding use of aggregation to unite
large numbers of unrelated investors into a lead plaintiff group).
143
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(b)(1) (2018). The Financial CHOICE Act would dramatically
increase this ownership threshold, prohibiting shareholders from making shareholder
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in many corporations, shareholders cannot call a special meeting unless they
own a substantial stake in the company.144 These ownership requirements are
not universal—small shareholders can, for example, request to inspect a
corporation’s books and records145—but they are far from uncommon.
Minimum ownership requirements are also consistent with the broader belief
in corporate law that ownership stakes matter. Individual shareholders have very
few rights in corporate law. Unless they own a majority of the company’s stock,
they cannot elect or remove directors, amend bylaws, force a merger, or stop
corporate transactions. Instead, these powers all rest with the shareholders as a
whole. In short, shareholder litigation is one of the only areas in which a single
shareholder owning a single share of stock can act on behalf of the corporation
or other shareholders. Given the agency costs in shareholder litigation,
shareholders would be justified in adopting new standing requirements that
bring shareholder litigation more in line with the norms in other parts of
corporate law.
2. Tools to Control Cost Asymmetries
Just as procedure offers tools to reduce agency costs, it also includes tools to
control cost asymmetries. As described in Part I, the litigation costs in most
shareholder lawsuits fall disproportionately on defendants. As a result,
defendants often make the rational cost-benefit calculation that it is cheaper to
settle and pay the plaintiffs’ fees than go through discovery and then try to get
the case dismissed. Each of the procedural tools described in the prior Section
could also help control cost asymmetries. Forum selection clauses, for example,
can funnel shareholder litigation into forums in which judges keep a more
watchful eye on discovery expenses, while enhanced standing requirements can
ensure that the representative shareholder has enough of a financial stake in the
corporation that it does not want to pressure the corporation into a nuisance
settlement. This Section explores additional procedural tools that have the
potential to address cost asymmetries, including heightened pleading
requirements, discovery limitations, and fee and cost shifting.
a. Heightened Pleading Requirements
Institutional investors could adopt heightened pleading requirements to
address the cost asymmetries in shareholder lawsuits. In general, shareholder
lawsuits filed under state law are subject to traditional notice pleading rules.
These pleading rules are quite minimal, requiring only that the plaintiff set forth
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

proposals unless they own at least one percent of the relevant company’s stock. See H.R. 10,
115th Cong. § 844 (2017).
144
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2019).
145
See id. § 220 (allowing any stockholder to inspect various corporate records).
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relief.”146 In contrast, shareholder lawsuits filed under federal law are subject to
heightened pleading requirements. The PSLRA imposes heightened pleading
requirements for two of the most crucial elements in a securities fraud claim—
whether the defendants made a false or misleading statement and whether they
acted with the required state of mind.147 It also prohibits plaintiffs from obtaining
any discovery until after they survive a motion to dismiss.148
The heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA have faced a significant
amount of criticism, and for good reason. These pleading requirements did help
address the cost asymmetry between the parties. They also, however,
exacerbated an information asymmetry between the parties. As discussed in Part
I,149 defendants bear a disproportionate share of the discovery costs in these
cases and thus have an economic incentive to settle even meritless cases.150 At
the same time, however, plaintiffs in these cases often lack the information they
need to evaluate the merits of their claims prior to discovery.151 This is especially
true when it comes to the element of scienter, which requires plaintiffs to allege
that the defendants knew what they were saying was false at the time they said
it.
The results were predictable. The PSLRA succeeded in reducing the number
of nuisance suits—exactly the result that Congress wanted. Yet it also eliminated
non-frivolous claims, as several empirical studies demonstrated.152 In short, the
heightened pleading requirements in the PSLRA made it harder for shareholders
to file both meritorious and nonmeritorious claims alike.

146

FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1), (2) (2012).
148
See id. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B).
149
See supra Section I.B.2.
150
See Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 38 n.2 (Del. 1996) (“It is a fact
evident to all of those who are familiar with shareholder litigation that surviving a motion to
dismiss means, as a practical matter, that economical rational defendants (who are usually not
apt to be repeat players in these kinds of cases) will settle such claims, often for a peppercorn
and a fee.”).
151
See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN L. REV. 497, 549 (1991) (“Since discovery in securities
class actions is almost completely one-sided, plaintiffs [or their attorneys] control the
discovery agenda.”).
152
See Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 64-67 (2009)
(“There is evidence . . . that pre-PSLRA nonnuisance claims would be less likely to be filed
under the PSLRA regime.”); Eric Talley & Gudrun Johnsen, Corporate Governance,
Executive Compensation and Securities Litigation (U.S.C. Gould Sch. of Law, Olin Research
Paper No. 04-7, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=536963
(presenting data “that even if the PSLRA reduced frivolous litigation (as its proponents
claim), it likely deterred meritorious litigation as well, and in such proportions as to swamp
the deterring effects on non–meritorious suits”).
147
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What would better heightened pleading requirements look like? First, they
would focus on specific elements of the claims in question. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly153 has been criticized for raising pleading standards across the board,
without regard to the difficulties of pleading facts that plaintiffs cannot obtain
prior to discovery.154 While any interpretation of Rule 8 inevitably applies to a
wide swath of claims with different elements and different fact-finding
challenges, heightened pleading requirements in corporate bylaws can be more
targeted.155
In derivative and merger litigation, heightened pleading requirements should
focus on facts supporting the claim that the directors and officers breached their
fiduciary duty. Fiduciary duty claims resemble tort claims,156 which involve four
elements: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.157 Any heightened
pleading requirements in this area should focus only on the second element—
breach of duty. Plaintiffs should have to allege facts with particularity showing
that the directors and officers breached their fiduciary duty. With respect to all
other elements of these claims, normal pleading rules should apply. These
targeted pleading requirements would require plaintiffs to put their cards on the
table early for the elements most central to the case, while allowing them to wait
longer for elements such as causation and damages that may be harder to support
with specific facts prior to the discovery process.
Second, new pleading requirements could include an exception for
information that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain. Such exceptions are
common in statutes imposing heightened pleading requirements, although the
PSLRA itself does not include one. For example, in proposed legislation related
to patent litigation, plaintiffs would have been required to plead certain specified
facts about their patent claim “unless the information is not reasonably
accessible.”158 The Act further stated that “if information required to be

153

550 U.S. 544 (2007).
See, e.g., Alexander Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 29 (2012) (“Where the informational asymmetry favors the responding
party . . . there is little justification for applying an information-forcing principle to the
pleader.”); Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Question, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 114 (2009)
(“If the operative pleading standard required plaintiff to allege facts that she cannot reasonably
be expected to know at the case’s inception, this informational asymmetry would in turn
prevent proper functioning of the litigation market.”).
155
See Erickson, supra note 8, at 89.
156
See J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris, Breaches of Fiduciary Duty and the
Delaware Uniform Contribution Act, 11 DEL. L. REV. 71, 71 (2010) (“We conclude that a
breach of a fiduciary duty is in fact a tort, although a unique species historically called an
‘equitable tort.’”). But see MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, No. 4521-CC, 2010 WL 1782271,
at *12 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (“Fiduciary duties exist independent of tort obligations.”).
157
Preston v. Preston, No. 6049, 1981 WL 15086, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 1981).
158
Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).
154
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disclosed under [the Act’s heightened pleading requirements] is not readily
accessible to a party after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, that information may instead be
generally described.”159 Under these circumstances, however, the plaintiff must
also include “an explanation of why such undisclosed information was not
readily accessible, and of any efforts made by such party to access such
information.”160 Such detailed requirements make it difficult for plaintiffs to
generically claim that the required facts are not reasonably accessible.
Finally, institutional investors can take steps to ensure that plaintiffs continue
to have access to pre-suit discovery. Heightened pleading requirements are often
criticized because plaintiffs have few ways to uncover the facts needed to
support their claims prior to discovery. Shareholder lawsuits, however, are
different. Many states, including Delaware, have laws that allow shareholders to
obtain copies of a company’s books and records as long as they have a proper
purpose for requesting this information.161 Courts have held that investigating
wrongdoing by the corporation’s managers is a “proper purpose” within the
scope of these statutes.162 These provisions are crucial to enabling plaintiffs to
obtain the facts necessary to comply with any new heightened pleading
requirements. Institutional investors should therefore ensure that companies are
complying with their requirements under these state law provisions.163
Thus far, the discussion has focused on new heightened pleading
requirements for state law claims. Institutional investors, however, could also
use this opportunity to revisit the heightened pleading requirements imposed by
the PSLRA on federal securities claims. Institutional investors could include an
exception to these requirements if the underlying facts needed to support certain
elements are not reasonably accessible, similar to the proposed exception
described above in fiduciary duty claims. Alternatively, investors could
eliminate the heightened pleading requirements that govern scienter entirely.
The PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirement regarding scienter has been
criticized extensively because it requires plaintiffs to allege facts regarding the
defendants’ intent without access to discovery.164 Heightened pleading
159

Id.
Id.
161
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2019); Melzer v. CNet Networks, Inc., 934
A.2d 912, 917 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Before shareholders may inspect books and records, they
must demonstrate . . . a proper purpose for seeking inspection.”).
162
Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121 (Del. 2006) (“It is well
established that a stockholder’s desire to investigate wrongdoing or mismanagement is a
‘proper purpose.’”).
163
In states that do not give shareholders the right to inspect a corporation’s books and
records, shareholders could include such a right in the corporation’s bylaws.
164
See, e.g., Choi, supra note 58, at 600 (“Without discovery until after the motion to
dismiss . . . plaintiffs face a difficult time in gathering facts related to the state of mind of
particular defendants in engaging in fraud.”).
160
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requirements are difficult enough to satisfy without requiring plaintiffs to allege
what was going on in the defendants’ heads at a specific moment in time. At the
time of the PSLRA, such heightened pleading requirements may have made
more sense because the default standards under Rule 9 were so lax.165 PostTwombly, however, plaintiffs now have to plead specific facts supporting all of
their claims,166 so the current default standards may suffice to solve any concerns
about lax pleading in this area.
As discussed further in Part III, it is not entirely clear whether such companyspecific overrides would be permissible. It is an open question whether
companies can modify—or even bypass altogether—the procedural
requirements imposed by statute. Are the PSLRA or state corporate governance
statutes merely a set of default rules that apply if and until companies choose to
change them? Or are they a mandatory set of requirements that apply even if
companies and their shareholders would prefer a different set of procedural
rules? As explored in Part III, the limits of private ordering in this area have
never been clearly delineated, but current law provides grounds for optimism
that shareholders can experiment in this area.167
b.

Cost and Fee Shifting

Shareholders should also consider provisions that allow fee and cost shifting
in shareholder litigation. Such provisions would reverse the presumption that
each side pays its own attorney’s fees and discovery costs. Under the right
circumstances, such reforms could help address the cost asymmetries in
shareholder lawsuits. The problem in cost asymmetric cases is that the plaintiff
has far less on the line than the defendant. They typically have less discovery
material because most shareholder plaintiffs have few relevant documents and
know relatively little about the case. Accordingly, their discovery costs (and the
accompanying attorneys’ fees to locate and produce this discovery) are typically
far lower than the defendants’ costs. As a result, the plaintiff has little to lose by
filing a meritless lawsuit.
Fee and cost shifting rules change this calculus, albeit in slightly different
ways. With fee shifting, plaintiffs who know that they will have to pay their
opponents’ legal fees if they lose will be far more reluctant to file a meritless
case. Additionally, defendants who know that they will be able to recover their
legal fees if they prevail will no longer see these fees as sunk costs. Along similar
lines, with cost shifting, plaintiffs would no longer be able to serve sweeping
requests on defendants and use the costs of responding as a lever in settlement
discussions. Instead, both sides would have an incentive to tailor their discovery
165
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 includes heightened pleading requirements for fraud
claims generally, but “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind
may be alleged generally.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
166
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-57 (2007).
167
See infra Section III.C (addressing legal hurdles that institutional investors may face in
implementing customized procedural rules).
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requests to the specific needs of the litigation. Unlike fee-shifting rules, which
only require losing parties to contribute to their opponents’ attorneys’ fees, costshifting rules require each side to share the costs of litigation, regardless of
which side ultimately prevails.
Although fee and cost shifting would both address the cost asymmetries in
litigation, fee-shifting rules stand on shakier legal ground than any of the other
procedural reforms suggested in this Part. In 2015, after intense lobbying by the
plaintiffs’ bar, the Delaware General Assembly banned fee shifting, stating that
“the bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose liability on a
stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other
party in connection with an internal corporate claim.”168 Delaware was right to
be concerned about corporations adopting fee-shifting provisions. Shareholder
plaintiffs have little to gain by serving in this role—receiving a pro rata share of
any recovery, plus a small incentive payment if approved by the court. If the
class action is not successful, however, the class representative would be liable
for the entire fee award, which could amount to millions of dollars. Faced with
this imbalance, few class representatives would agree to lend their name to a
lawsuit.
Yet such concerns do not mean that these provisions always place shareholder
litigation in peril. There are ways to implement fee-shifting rules that would not
discourage class representatives from participating in suits, while also
complying with Delaware’s new limitations. Instead of making class
representatives liable for the defendants’ costs, for example, shareholders could
require class counsel to pay the defendant’s legal fees if the lawsuit is
unsuccessful. This rule would not violate Delaware’s statutory prohibition
against fee shifting, which only bars provisions that impose liability “on a
stockholder.”169 Attorneys are not stockholders, at least in the typical suit, so
they are not covered by the statute.170
Standing alone, applying fee-shifting rules to attorneys would not address
Delaware’s concerns, even if it would be outside the scope of the state’s

168

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019).
Id.
170
Opponents could argue that the legal system is not perfect and thus firms could be
penalized if they file a meritorious suit that is nonetheless unsuccessful. The market, however,
could provide a solution to this concern. In England, for example, a robust after-the-event
(“ATE”) insurance market allows a party who is nervous about the consequences of losing at
trial to purchase insurance to cover his opponent’s legal fees in event of a loss. See, e.g.,
Jonathan T. Molot, Fee Shifting and The Free Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1820-21
(2013) (“Claimants able to purchase ATE insurance can proceed with meritorious claims
without fear of bearing their opponents’ costs.”). A similar market could theoretically protect
law firms that would otherwise personally bear the cost of unsuccessful claims. The actuarial
nature of insurance markets could incentivize law firms to screen their cases carefully, while
also providing a safety net if the legal system disagrees with a firm on the merits of a particular
claim.
169
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legislation as presently worded. Instead, it would simply discourage a different
group from participating in these cases, if these attorneys stand to lose more than
they might gain. Accordingly, shareholders should couple any fee-shifting rules
with a related provision awarding prevailing class counsel higher fees than they
currently receive. This approach would increase both the risk and reward of
shareholder lawsuits, creating even greater incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to
choose wisely when deciding which cases to file.171
Even with these modifications, however, shareholders should exercise
caution when adopting fee- and cost-shifting rules. These rules radically change
the economic structure of representative litigation, and it is easy to imagine the
rules having unanticipated consequences, especially since the U.S. legal system
has little experience with these procedural tools. For example, shareholders
would not want to implement rules that create costly satellite litigation over the
exact amount of discovery costs or attorneys’ fees to be billed to the other side.
Nor would they want to give defendants an incentive to drive up their discovery
costs to give them leverage in settlement negotiations. There are ways to
ameliorate these concerns—courts can manage the discovery process more
closely or the parties can agree on their discovery plans up front172—but these
solutions are unlikely to completely eliminate concerns about satellite litigation
and perverse incentives.
In addition, fee and cost shifting could inhibit shareholders’ access to justice.
Larger plaintiffs’ firms could likely absorb the costs of discovery, as well as
their opponents’ attorneys’ fees, if they lose. Smaller firms, however, may be in
a more financially precarious position, unable to absorb a multi-million dollar
award of fees or costs to the defendants. For these firms, even if they think their
claims are meritorious, the mere possibility of bankrupting their firm may steer
them away from claims shareholders would like them to bring. One way to
reduce this risk is to cap the fees. For example, these provisions could make
firms liable for the first one million dollrs of the company’s legal fees, or the

171
One concern with this approach is that it could create a conflict of interest between
class counsel and members of the class. There could be situations in which class counsel
would be better off with a lower settlement rather than risk having to pay their opponents’
legal fees if the case continues, even if the class itself, facing no such risk of loss, would rather
roll the dice on a judgment at trial. These conflicts already exist to some extent in any class
action, given that class counsel often advances the costs of the lawsuit and, through the
contingency fee, may stand to gain more than any individual class member. Nonetheless, if
shareholder plaintiffs have sizable stakes in the case (as anticipated by the minimum
ownership and damage rules described above), plaintiffs should be able to mediate these
concerns with their counsel. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing methods
such as minimum ownership to prevent abusive shareholder litigation practices).
172
See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 859 (2015)
(proposing model by which parties develop litigation budget at start of case and present it for
court approval, following similar proposal adopted in United Kingdom).
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first five hundred thousand of the company’s discovery costs.173 Alternatively,
this cap could depend on the size of the target company or the amount of claimed
damages, expressly allowing smaller law firms to incur less risk by suing smaller
firms or bringing claims with lower potential damages.
Even with these accommodations in mind, the concerns suggest that
shareholders might want to try the other procedural tools suggested in this Part
before adopting fee or cost shifting provisions. The field of civil procedure offers
a variety of tools for addressing agency costs and cost asymmetries, but each
comes with its own risks and challenges. With heightened pleading, plaintiffs
risk dismissal of their claims.174 With fee or cost shifting, however, plaintiffs (or
their attorneys) risk financial ruin. As a result, fee and cost shifting could
discourage borderline claims that shareholders and their attorneys think could
have merit, even if they are not legal slam dunks. Companies may want to
stagger adoption of these procedures to see if more modest measures, such as
heightened pleading or minimum ownership requirements, will solve the
problems in these cases before adopting more sweeping procedures, such as fee
or cost shifting.
c.

Arbitration

No review of procedural alternatives would be complete without a discussion
of arbitration. The procedures outlined above would all apply within the
traditional legal system. Yet parties can opt out of this system altogether by
sending their dispute to arbitration. Each arbitration body has its own set of
procedural rules,175 which are often considerably different than the procedural
rules that apply in a court.
Although shareholders may have the legal right to arbitrate their claims,176
that does not mean that it is in their best interest to do so. Arbitration is often
thought to be cheaper and faster than traditional litigation, in large part because
discovery is much more limited.177 Yet limited discovery in arbitration is not a
173

The insurance markets described above, see supra note 170, could similarly help defray
these potential risks.
174
For further discussion of heightened pleading, see supra Section II.B.2.a.
175
See infra note 177 (outlining procedural rules for arbitration).
176
But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2019) (prohibiting forum selection clauses that
send shareholder litigation to any jurisdiction other than Delaware courts). It is an open
question whether this law passes muster under the Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2012) (prohibiting states from banning arbitration clauses in written contracts).
177
See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, INCLUDING
PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 19 (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N
2013) (outling rules for pre-hearing exchange and production); INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 25 (INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2014) (“The tribunal
may, upon application, require a party to make available to another party documents in that
party’s possession not otherwise available to the party seeking the documents, that are
reasonably believed to exist and to be relevant and material to the outcome of the case.”).
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sure thing. Indeed, the New York State Bar recently noted that “there has been
a trend to inject into arbitration expensive elements that had traditionally been
reserved for litigation—interrogatories; requests to admit; dispositive motions;
lengthy depositions; and massive requests for documents, including electronic
data.”178 Parties now bemoan the fact that discovery in arbitration has “spiraled
out of control” as arbitrators make ad hoc decisions about how much discovery
should occur in individual cases.179 It is still true that parties generally get less
discovery in arbitration, but it is hardly a sure bet.180 As a result, agreements to
arbitrate shareholder claims do not put to bed concerns about discovery costs.
Moreover, if shareholders want more limited discovery rights, they do not
need to go to arbitration to get them. Instead, they can stay in the traditional legal
system, but limit the discovery rights that apply in this system. Discovery rules
are largely default rules, and parties are free to amend them.181 For example,
corporate bylaws could narrow the scope of discovery or provide that parties are
only entitled to a certain number of depositions.182 They can also provide that
the parties are only entitled to discovery specifically approved by a judge.183
Alternatively, if shareholders are nervous about tying their own hands before
they know the details of the dispute, they can instead provide for cost shifting,
as suggested above, which forces each side to decide whether the benefits of the
requested discovery is worth the costs.184 In short, discovery costs alone do not
justify a retreat to arbitration.
The other purported benefit of arbitration is that it checks the dangers of
aggregate litigation. The opt-out nature of most class actions means that class

178

N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT BY ARBITRATION COMMITTEE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SECTION: ARBITRATION DISCOVERY IN DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL CASES 1 (2009),
https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Dispute_Resolution/Dispute_Resolution_PDFs/ARBITRA
TION_DISCOVERY__IN_DOMESTIC_COMMERCIAL_CASES.html [https://perma.cc/6
9QB-R7EK].
179
Id. (“In some cases, it has spiraled out of control and has reached a point where some
users of arbitration feel that there is little difference between arbitration and litigation.”).
180
Nor is arbitration necessarily faster than litigation. See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build
It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 585 (2007) (noting that the average time to resolve a case
through arbitration is only slightly shorter that the median time to resolve a case through the
litigation system).
181
See FED. R. CIV. P. 29 (“Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate
that . . . procedures governing or limiting discovery be modified.”).
182
See Jessica Erickson, Bespoke Procedure, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1873, 1876 (2018) (“To
address concerns that discovery is too expensive, parties can agree ex ante to limit the scope
of discovery, place caps on the number of depositions or document requests, or enter into
binding discovery budgets.”).
183
See id. at 1891 (“Parties can also agree that they are only entitled to discovery if their
discovery request is specifically approved by a judge or arbitrator.”).
184
See supra Section II.B.2.b (detailing concept of cost shifting).
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members are joined in the suit unless they affirmatively opt out.185 As a result,
defendants may feel pressured to settle because the potential damages can be so
high that the suit threatens the company’s financial viability.186 Many arbitration
clauses, however, include class action waivers, allowing injured parties to sue
only on their own behalf.187 These waivers allow defendants to avoid aggregate
claims and the dangers that go along with them.188 In theory, such a limitation
might be appealing to those reflecting on the troubled history of shareholder
class actions.
Yet prohibiting shareholders from joining together to bring their claims would
ultimately hurt many shareholders. Some shareholders, especially large
shareholders with positive value claims, would be fine in a regime that does not
permit class actions.189 Smaller shareholders, however, would find it cost
prohibitive to bring their claims on an individual basis. As a result, they would
be effectively barred from seeking compensation for their claims.190 Just as
importantly, shrinking the number of potential claimants reduces the overall
deterrent effects of shareholder litigation, hurting large and small shareholders

185
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (stating that class members can be automatically included in
suit unless they opt out of class); Scott Dodson, An Opt-in Option for Class Actions, 115
MICH. L. REV. 171, 173 (2016) (“The empirical evidence strongly suggests that opt-out classes
are much larger than opt-in classes and that individual litigation by excluded class members
is rare.”).
186
Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1890 (2004) (“[C]ertification increases
plaintiffs’ opportunities for profit . . . .”).
187
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882-84 (2008) (finding that eighty percent of
contracts imposed by financial services and telecommunications firms contained class action
waivers).
188
See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 425-27 (2005) (discussing why class action
waivers will become more commonly used).
189
See David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
201, 233 (2015) (arguing that trustees overseeing institutional investment vehicles have
fiduciary duty to bring positive-value claims).
190
And ironically, even if small shareholders could not sue themselves, they would still
have to pay (at least indirectly) the costs of securities class actions because they have a
financial stake in the target corporation. In other words, channeling shareholder claims into
arbitration would take money from the pockets of smaller shareholders and put it in the
pockets of larger shareholders. See id. at 259 (“Conversely, many smaller institutional
investors and most, if not all, individual investors will have negative-value claims.
Consequently, they will have no remedy for their wrong. Yet they may very well remain
invested in the defendant company after the fraud.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413160

1406

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1367

alike.191 If corporate managers think that their potential liability has plummeted,
they may be more likely to enrich themselves at shareholders’ expense.192
This discussion reveals a powerful lesson about the role of procedural
rulemaking. In the past, when new procedural rules were incorporated into
corporate bylaws, they were almost always pro-defense—i.e., reforms that make
it more difficult for shareholders to bring representative claims.193 Yet, while
corporate boards prefer such procedures, their shareholders may well have more
nuanced views about the right procedures for these cases because it is not always
in their interest to make it more difficult to bring shareholder lawsuits.
Sometimes the right procedural tools will curtail shareholders suits, while other
times they will make it easier to file these claims.194 In short, as we will see, it
takes the right incentives to push for the right procedures.
III. PROMOTING A NEW MARKET FOR CORPORATE PROCEDURE
The analysis thus far demonstrates that procedural reform can play a pivotal
role in addressing the problems that have long plagued shareholder litigation. In
a perfect world, the story would end there. Once we know what new procedures
to adopt, we could simply adopt them, and the problems would be solved. In the
complicated world of shareholder litigation, however, identifying the right
reforms is only the first piece of the puzzle. The right actors must also push for
their adoption. Corporate law has long relied on three groups to address the

191

Scholars have long argued that deterrence is the central goal of shareholder litigation.
See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors and Officers
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 762 (2009) (“Scholars
customarily treat deterrence as the principal objective of civil damages in corporate and
securities litigation.”); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b–5, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1314 (2008) (“[M]ost commentators now agree that the prototypical
Rule 10b–5 class action (i.e., one brought against a nontrading corporation for its officer’s
fraud-on-the-market) cannot be defended on compensatory grounds.”).
192
It is possible that the dynamics would play out differently if, for example, the large
shareholders who brought individual claims insisted that officer and director defendants
personally paid part of the settlement proceeds, rather than relying entirely on their insurance
carrier. See, e.g., Webber, supra note 189, at 264 (“It is also possible that institutional
investors will demand, as a condition for settling an arbitration, that individually culpable
defendants make personal payments towards the settlement.”).
193
For a discussion of fee-shifting bylaws, see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
194
While this Part proposes some procedural reforms that shareholders could adopt, it is
by no means an exhaustive list. Shareholders might experiment with limitations on discovery
or new summary judgment standards, or they might tinker with damage rules. Further still,
they might decide to repeal some of the procedural relics that have long been associated with
certain types of shareholder litigation, such as the demand requirement or contemporaneous
ownership requirement in derivative suits. The point is not that there is a single procedural
talisman that will solve all of the problems in shareholder litigation, but rather that companies
should experiment to find the right procedural tools for their particular situation.
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problems in shareholder litigation: judges, legislatures, and corporate boards.
Yet, as explained below, none of these groups have the right incentives to
promote the necessary procedural changes.
This Part suggests a new actor to drive these reforms: institutional investors.
Institutional investors have the right financial incentives to push for these new
reforms because they stand on both sides of these lawsuits. As a result, they are
financially invested in both preserving meritorious lawsuits and blocking
meritless ones. No other group has these dual incentives. The discussion below
first explains why other groups have run into roadblocks in trying to solve the
problems in shareholder litigation. It then explains why institutional investors
are uniquely situated to push for the procedural reforms laid out in Part II.
A.

Institutional Roadblocks

Corporate law has traditionally looked to judges, legislatures, and corporate
boards to solve the problems in shareholder litigation. This Section explains why
none of these groups have the right incentives and/or power to advocate for
sweeping procedural reform.
1.

Judicial Reform

Judges already use procedure as a key weapon in their effort to monitor
shareholder litigation.195 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, class
actions and derivative suits cannot settle without the approval of the presiding
judge.196 In carrying out this responsibility, judges are supposed to ensure that
proposed settlements are “fair, reasonable, and adequate” in protecting the
interests of represented parties.197 In theory, therefore, judges already have a
procedural tool to address the problems in shareholder litigation.
In practice, however, this tool falls short. Judges cannot easily probe under
the surface of most settlements. Unlike motions practice where the parties are
on opposite sides and are quick to point out the weaknesses of each other’s
arguments, settlements are a joint proposal by the parties. The non-adversarial
nature of settlement hearings means that it is difficult for judges to discern the
problems in proposed settlements. The Delaware Court of Chancery has stated,
for example, that it is forced to become a “forensic examiner . . . play[ing]
devil’s advocate” to determine the value of settlement terms.198

195

See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 390 (2011)
(“Their job is to adjust for and counteract the agency problems and litigation gaps. It is
through this process that the judges become settlement gatekeepers.”).
196
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), 23.1(c) (outlining procedure for class action settlement and
derivative actions).
197
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
198
See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 2016).
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Few judges are willing to play this role. Most judges have busy dockets, and
they do not want to go looking for a fight where none exists.199 Moreover, even
if judges decide to inquire more deeply, they may find it difficult to hold onto
their cases. Delaware’s experience trying to crack down on merger litigation
illustrates this point. As discussed in Section II.A, plaintiffs’ attorneys took their
cases elsewhere when Delaware judges tried to rein in disclosure-only
settlements.200 In other words, there is a clear downside in relying on judges to
police nuisance settlements—many judges do not want to play this role, and
those who do lack the tools to hold onto their cases.
Nor can judges simply adopt new procedural tools to augment their existing
ones. Judges enforce the procedural rules on the books; they do not write the
rules themselves. They do have some flexibility to fill in procedural gaps in the
existing rules through local rules or standing orders, but they cannot adopt
altogether new requirements. As a result, even if judges wanted to adopt the new
procedures outlined in Part II, they lack the power to do so.
2. Legislatures
The legislative branch has an easier time making wholesale changes to the
law. While individual judges are limited to the cases pending before them,
Congress can enact laws that apply to all cases of a given type. In enacting the
PSLRA for example, Congress made sweeping changes to the law governing
securities class actions, regardless of where these cases were filed.201 State
legislatures are more limited in their reach, but they can still alter the rules in
cases governed by their states’ law. It is no surprise, therefore, that both federal
and state legislators have occasionally tried to fix the problems in shareholder
litigation.202
Their efforts, however, reveal the downsides of relying on the legislative
branch to develop nuanced solutions to complex litigation challenges.
Legislators are subject to lobbying by those whose interests may be impacted by
new legislation. With the PSLRA, for example, Congress heard extensive
testimony from corporate America regarding the problems with securities class

199

See, e.g., Sale, supra note 195, at 411 (“Of course, if judicial gatekeepers spend more
time on settlements, they may increase the amount of time that cases spend on the docket.
Busy judges will then face their own personal and professional conflicts with resisting and
scrutinizing settlements.”).
200
For further discussion, see supra Section II.A.
201
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (outlining investigations and actions).
202
See, e.g., id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (prohibiting bylaws of Delaware
corporations from containing “any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for
the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an
internal corporate claim”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (2017) (adopting loser pays rules in
derivative suits filed against Oklahoma corporations).
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actions.203 It heard much less from the investors who benefit from these suits.
This partisan jockeying left little opportunity for careful consideration of
appropriate solutions. As a result, as discussed above,204 the PSLRA includes
many procedural reforms inappropriate for the information asymmetries that
plaintiffs in these suits face.205
State legislatures are not immune from these challenges. In Delaware, for
example, the General Assembly relies on the corporate bar to suggest and draft
changes related to corporate law.206 These lawyers, while certainly
knowledgeable, have a vested interest in ensuring that shareholder litigation
remains a viable source of income for Delaware lawyers.207 As a result, they are
unlikely to take any broad action that might threaten their monopoly.208 In other
states, legislative action is difficult for different reasons. Few states outside of
Delaware see enough shareholder litigation to make legislative action
worthwhile, and even those state legislatures that choose to address it are
unlikely to have enough expertise in the area to develop nuanced legislative
solutions.209
3.

Corporate Boards

Perhaps recognizing the limitations of judges and legislatures, corporate law
recently vested boards of directors with greater power to police shareholder
203

See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms.
& Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong. 217 (1994) (testimony of
Stephen F. Smith, Gen. Counsel, Exabyte Corp.) (alleging plaintiffs’ attorneys often utilized
computer-generated boilerplate complaints).
204
See supra notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
205
See Erickson, supra note 8, at 71-72, 113-16.
206
See Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 48 (2014)
(“Council of Corporation Law, a group of 27 well-respected attorneys mostly from prominent
Wilmington firms, proposes all amendments to the DGCL. The Council writes the corporate
law of Delaware and, by extension, the country.”).
207
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory
of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987) (“[R]ules that Delaware
supplies often can be viewed as attempts to maximize revenues to the bar, and more
particularly to an elite cadre of Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the state.”).
208
See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 875 (“[I]f [Delaware] wishes to ensure that future
legislation advances both sound public policy and the State’s financial interests, the General
Assembly needs to free itself from the bar’s influence.”).
209
For example, Oklahoma recently adopted a fee-shifting statute pursuant to which losing
parties in derivative suits are now required to pay their opponents’ expenses, including
attorneys’ fees. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (2017). Commentators have reported that this
statute was the result of lobbying by a prominent Oklahoma company, Continental Resources,
which had faced a fiduciary duty lawsuit. See Gary W. Derrick, Recent Developments in
Oklahoma Business and Corporate Law 2014, at 11 (2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://derrickandbriggs.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Seminar-paper-recentdevelopments-2014.docx [https://perma.cc/K944-Y9UE]. The statute itself reflects these prodefense roots, making it financially perilous for any shareholder to file a derivative suit.
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litigation. As discussed above, in 2010, the Delaware Court of Chancery invited
corporations concerned about litigating in multiple jurisdictions to include a
forum selection provision in their corporate charter.210 Following this invitation,
several hundred companies adopted forum selection provisions.211 This
development paved the way for corporations to consider other types of private
ordering, including fee-shifting bylaws,212 minimum ownership requirements,213
and arbitration provisions.214 Scholars have largely cheered on this development,
while exploring other ways that corporations can engage in litigation selfhelp.215
The problem is that there is significant reason to question whether corporate
directors are the right people to rewrite these rules, at least on their own.216
Directors are typically among the defendants in these cases.217 As a result, they
draft procedures that will govern suits that may later be filed against them and,
in doing so, they will inevitably be influenced by concerns about their own selfinterest. For obvious reasons, the legal system does not usually put parties in
charge of drafting the procedural rules that will later determine their legal fate.
210
In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and value
promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter
provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”).
211
See Romano & Sanga, supra note 104, at 3 (finding that, as of August 2014, 754 public
companies had adopted these provisions).
212
The Delaware General Assembly has since prohibited these provisions. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (“The bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose
liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other
party in connection with an internal corporate claim . . . .”).
213
Soon after the Delaware Supreme Court upheld fee-shifting bylaws, four related
companies announced bylaws prohibiting its stockholders from initiating a direct or derivative
claim unless the claiming stockholder delivers to the corporate secretary written consent by
beneficial stockholders owning at least three percent of the outstanding shares. See, e.g.,
Imperial Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 30, 2014) (“[C]urrent or prior
shareholder or group of shareholders . . . may not initiate a claim in a court of law on behalf
of . . . any class of current and/or prior shareholders against the corporation . . . unless the
Claiming Shareholder . . . delivers to the Secretary written consents by beneficial
shareholders owning at least 3% of the outstanding shares of the corporation . . . .”).
214
See Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in
Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 587 (2016) (arguing that Federal
Arbitration Act does not require states to uphold corporate bylaw or charter provisions
mandating that shareholder claims be arbitrated).
215
See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 16, at 3 (promoting “No Pay” provisions).
216
See infra Section III.B (discussing merit to having corporate boards play role in
development of procedural bylaws, but also risk of having boards do so without significant
input or oversight from other corporate constituencies).
217
See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 852 n.1 (using term shareholder litigation to encompass
suits by “shareholders under state corporate law against any combination of the corporate
entity and its officers and directors”).
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The perils of this approach are far from theoretical. As discussed in Part II,
after the Delaware Court of Chancery invited boards to take procedure into their
own hands, many boards amended their bylaws to include fee-shifting
provisions.218 Representative shareholders only receive their pro rata share of
the recovery if the suit is successful, but these provisions made them liable for
100% of the costs if it is not successful.219 This combination of high risks and
low rewards makes it financially perilous for any shareholder to serve as a lead
plaintiff, threatening the entire shareholder litigation franchise. As a result, if the
goal of these boards was to eliminate all shareholder litigation, these bylaw
provisions were a good start.
So far, courts have been relatively unconcerned about these potential conflicts
of interests. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund220 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that litigation-limiting charter and bylaw provisions are
facially valid.221 The court retained the right to review these provisions on an asapplied basis to determine whether they are “adopted by the appropriate
corporate procedures and for a proper corporate purpose.”222 This standard, for
example, might prohibit a board from adopting protective procedures after its
members have been sued. It does not, however, account for the more pervasive
structural biases that exist when boards adopt procedures that may later govern
litigation filed against them.223
Courts are not the only bodies that can try to guard against these structural
biases. Directors ultimately answer to shareholders in elections that take place
every one to three years.224 If directors put procedures in place that insulate them
from shareholder litigation, and shareholders oppose the move, in theory they
can vote the directors out of office at the next election. Shareholders can also
sell their stock, choosing to invest in companies that offer shareholders greater
opportunities to constrain managerial agency costs. If enough shareholders sell
their shares, the stock price will fall, financially penalizing the corporation. Or

218

See id. at 858 (noting that “over fifty Delaware corporations adopted fee-shifting
bylaws by April 2015”).
219
See, e.g., Lebovitch & van Kwawegen, supra note 14, at 515-16 (“[I]t will be difficult
for even the largest institutional investors to take the risk of paying millions, or tens of
millions, of dollars in defense attorneys’ fees to correct corporate misconduct when their
individual, pro rata share of the potential benefit or recovery created by the litigation will only
be a fraction of the total benefit sought . . . .”).
220
91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
221
Id. at 560 (“Under Delaware law, a fee-shifting by-law is not invalid per se . . . .”).
222
Id. at 554.
223
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Paving the Delaware Way: Legislative
and Equitable Limits on Bylaws After ATP, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 335, 357-60 (2015)
(proposing that courts use enhanced scrutiny in reviewing litigation-limiting bylaw
provisions).
224
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2019) (“[A]t each annual election held after such
classification becomes effective, directors shall be chosen for a full term . . . .”).
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shareholders can simply overrule directors, amending the bylaws on their own
to delete or amend the procedures put in place by the board. In theory, therefore,
shareholders can constrain procedural rulemaking by directors.
In practice, however, shareholders are limited in their ability to control
directors. Shareholder voting has long been criticized for its inability to serve as
an effective check on director power.225 At many corporations’ annual elections,
there is only a single slate of directors. Shareholders unhappy with their
performance can withhold their vote, but the slate will likely still be elected.
Shareholders can put up their own slate, but this process is extremely expensive
and time-consuming.226 Similar hurdles apply when shareholders try to amend
corporate bylaws on their own.227
This analysis is not meant to cast aspersions on corporate boards. Corporate
law vests significant power in corporate boards,228 and for good reason.229 At the
same time, however, the law has long recognized that boards have conflicts of
interests that sometimes require greater judicial scrutiny and that the market is
constrained in its ability to monitor.230 These conflicts are fully present when
boards insert litigation-limiting provisions into corporations’ governing
documents. Accordingly, corporate boards should not be the primary drivers of
procedural reform.
B.

The Unique Potential of Institutional Investors

Corporate law was on the right track when it invited corporations to include
procedural innovations in their governing documents. Procedure is designed to
sort the good cases from the bad, and, if done right, it can reduce the incentives
to enter into nuisance settlements. To date, however, corporate boards have been
the primary drafters of new procedural rules to govern shareholder lawsuits,
creating a structural bias when they draft procedures that may later be used
against them. Institutional investors, on the other hand, have far better economic

225
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 676 (2007) (“[S]hareholder franchise does not provide the solid foundation for the
legitimacy of directorial power that it is supposed to supply.”).
226
See id. at 688 (stating that “even when shareholder dissatisfaction with board actions
and decisions is substantial, challengers face considerable impediments to replacing boards”).
227
See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 22, at 377 (“[T]he board’s power to adopt and amend bylaw
provisions may, for a variety of reasons, be greater than the shareholders’ corresponding
power to do so.”).
228
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors . . . .”).
229
See Stephen Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 6-9 (2002) (explaining rationale behind director power in corporate law).
230
See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (using
enhanced scrutiny to review board’s adoption of defensive mechanisms); Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (using enhanced scrutiny to review board’s
rejection of shareholder demand in derivative suit).
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and organizational incentives to draft these new procedures. This Section first
explores why institutional investors are better positioned than other potential
actors to draft these rules, before turning to the legal hurdles that may stand in
their way.
1.

The Right Financial Incentives

Institutional investors have a direct financial stake in ensuring that
shareholder lawsuits work effectively. It is their money on the line if corporate
managers breach their fiduciary duties or other legal obligations. It is also their
money on the line if corporations have to pay to defend against and settle
frivolous lawsuits. This Section first examines the economic benefits of new
procedural rules for shareholders as a whole and then explores whether
individual shareholders have sufficient incentives to promote these new rules.
a.

Aggregate Financial Incentives

New procedural rules could increase the net return for shareholders because
shareholders stand on both sides of most shareholder lawsuits. On one hand,
shareholders are the beneficiaries of any judgments in these cases. In merger and
securities class actions, shareholders receive their pro rata share of the settlement
fund directly.231 In derivative suits, the recovery goes to the corporation, but still
indirectly benefits shareholders by increasing the overall value of the
company.232 On the other hand, shareholders also pay the costs of these cases,
at least indirectly. When a corporation, its directors, and its officers are sued, the
corporation typically pays its own attorneys’ fees and the fees of its directors
and officers.233 If the case settles, the court often orders the defendant
corporations to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees as well.234 These amounts
ultimately come out of the shareholders’ pockets.
The amount of money at stake can be significant. One study found that public
pension funds reported receiving an average of $6.75 million in the prior fiscal

231
See Webber, supra note 189, at 223 (stating that many investors “passively participate
in class actions by collecting their pro rata share of settlement”).
232
See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder
Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 81 (2008) (“Any recovery in a derivative suit is
returned to the corporation. As a result, shareholders may receive an indirect benefit from a
derivative suit because of their share of ownership in the corporation, but they do not receive
any direct financial benefit.”).
233
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (providing for indemnification of corporate
officers and directors).
234
See Griffith, supra note 50, at 10 (“The plaintiffs’ lawyers, nevertheless, are entitled to
recover their fees from the defendant corporation on the basis of the settlement’s therapeutic
benefit.”). Even if these amounts are covered by directors and officers insurance, shareholders
still pay through higher premiums.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413160

1414

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1367

year in recoveries from litigation.235 The potential gains in individual cases can
be even greater, with another study finding that public pension funds seeking to
serve as lead plaintiffs have an average claimed loss of $9.2 million.236 These
figures suggest that improvements in how these suits function could directly
impact investors’ bottom lines.
Beyond these direct recoveries, new procedural rules could also increase the
deterrent impact of shareholder litigation more broadly. Shareholder litigation
has two goals: to compensate shareholders that have been injured financially by
violations of the law and to deter future breaches of fiduciary duty, both by the
managers of the targeted company and by managers at other companies.237 If
managers see that their counterparts at other companies are being held
accountable for their bad acts, these managers may decide to be more careful
about their own behavior. As a result, in addition to their recovery in specific
cases, shareholders may benefit from the policing effect on managers at the other
companies in which they invest.
The deterrent value of these suits will likely increase if the number of
meritless claims is reduced. Shareholders lose financially when shareholder
litigation becomes overrun with frivolous cases. If managers believe that they
will be sued no matter what decisions they make—as is currently the case in
merger litigation and, to a lesser extent, derivative litigation and securities class
actions—shareholder litigation will not have the same impact on managerial
behavior. Similarly, if managers know that they can get a case dismissed by
offering relatively inconsequential disclosures or corporate governance reforms,
they will have less fear of personal liability. Shareholder litigation is one of the
primary means for shareholders to control managerial agency costs,238 and
anything that compromises the effectiveness of these suits ultimately hurts
shareholders. As a result, addressing the problems in these lawsuits would
benefit investors as a whole, but only if the solution is also nuanced enough to
protect meritorious suits.

235
Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the
Developing Role of Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 333
(2008) (“We find that funds in our sample reported recovering an average of $6.75 million in
the prior fiscal year . . . .”).
236
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis
of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1621 n.130, 1622
n.134 (2006).
237
See Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93
IOWA L. REV. 929, 951 (2008) (“First, fiduciary duty litigation is intended to deter fiduciary
duty breaches ex ante; second, it is intended to compensate for the losses those breaches cause
ex post.”).
238
See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 223, at 363 (“[B]y enabling equitable review
of managers’ actions, shareholder litigation gives shareholders a powerful tool to protect their
welfare and, as the Delaware Way recognizes, constrain the broad legal authority Delaware
law invests in managers.”).
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This point reflects a broader point about procedural rulemaking. The best
procedural rules are written by those who do not know which side of the case
they will eventually be on.239 Similar to the Rawlsian veil of ignorance,240 if
drafters write procedures without knowing whether they will be the plaintiff or
the defendant, they are much more likely to write procedural rules that aim to be
fair and neutral. Shareholders are in exactly this position. They may be the
plaintiffs in a future case if a corporate board engages in self-dealing or other
egregious conduct, but they could also find themselves standing with the
corporate defendants opposing a meritless lawsuit. Without a crystal ball, they
simply cannot predict which side they will be on in any particular case. As a
result, they want procedural rules that will accurately sort the cases with merit
from those without.
This observation sets shareholders apart from the other groups that could help
address the problems in shareholder litigation. Shareholders are the only group
with the right financial incentives when it comes to procedural rulemaking.
Corporate directors, even if they are not actively facing a lawsuit, know that they
could be defendants in these suits at some point in the future, creating a
legitimate concern that their proposals will reflect this bias. The attorneys on
both sides of these suits have a financial interest in making sure that these suits
continue unabated. And judges do not have any financial skin in the game, which
means that they often lack an incentive to come up with systemic solutions,
especially if their caseload includes only a few shareholder suits. In short,
although many groups may want to solve the problems in shareholder litigation,
only shareholders are financially invested in ensuring that any solution is
balanced enough to let the meritorious suits proceed while screening out the
meritless ones. And, unlike judges, shareholders have the power to address these
problems through their ability to amend corporate bylaws.
b.

Incentives for Individual Investors

Even if shareholders as a whole have the right financial incentives to engage
in balanced procedural rulemaking, can they overcome the collective action
problems necessary to push these reforms? In other words, do individual

239
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian
Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 540 (2003) (“Each agent knows that
after the veil of ignorance is lifted she will be better off with an option that lets her use the
information she has to contract for alternative procedures that improve her prospects.”); Bruce
L. Hay, Procedural Justice–Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1847 (1997) (“To
the extent that impartiality is considered a central or fundamental value by the procedure
community, it may be that this community’s own commitments require it to employ
something like the Rawlsian procedure when designing procedure.”).
240
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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institutional investors have enough money on the line to take the lead in these
efforts?241
These questions reflect the fact that procedural rulemaking is a form of
shareholder activism, and such activism has always suffered from a free rider
problem.242 Although all of a corporation’s shareholders may benefit from
activism, the costs of activism are borne almost entirely by the activists
themselves. Even if, for example, all shareholders of a given company agreed
that heightened pleading is necessary to screen shareholder lawsuits, it may not
be cost-effective for any single shareholder to take the lead in proposing this
new rule. These efforts are further complicated by the fact that institutional
investors are competing against each other to attract customers.243 As a result,
an effort by one institution to promote firm-specific reforms may raise their
individual costs relative to their competitors and accordingly cause them to lose
customers.244 The key question is whether this reluctance will doom any
procedural rulemaking efforts.
The experience of the PSLRA provides a reason for optimism. The PSLRA
created a rebuttable presumption that the lead plaintiff in a securities class action
should be the shareholder applicant with the greatest financial stake in the
litigation.245 When this statute was enacted in 1995, there was concern that few
institutional investors would take Congress up on its invitation to lead these
suits.246 Just like procedural rulemaking, it costs money to serve as a lead
plaintiff in a securities class action, and an institution may find it difficult to
recoup these costs given that the benefits of a securities class action are spread
among all shareholders. Slowly, however, institutions got involved, and today
institutions serve as lead plaintiffs in nearly half of all securities class actions.247

241

See Romano, supra note 3, at 55 (“The efficacy of shareholder litigation as a
governance mechanism is hampered by collective action problems because the cost of
bringing a lawsuit, while less than the shareholders’ aggregate gain, is typically greater than
a shareholder–plaintiff’s pro rata benefit.”).
242
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 671, 699 (1995) (describing “institutional activism” as “classic example of a
situation in which free riding is highly likely”).
243
See Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting
in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1392 (2014) (“From the fund’s
perspective, any monies spent on voting may reduce marginally the firm’s relative
performance compared to its competitors.”).
244
See Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 300 (2008) (“Many institutions
were reluctant to incur the expenses of engaging in monitoring activities because this could
depress portfolio returns, whereas any benefits would be shared with their competitors.”).
245
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012).
246
See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 236, at 1602 (stating in 2006 that “institutional
investors have been slow to answer the call to become lead plaintiffs”).
247
See id. at 1597-602.
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Why are institutional investors willing to participate in these suits, despite the
collective action problems? The institutions that most commonly serve as lead
plaintiffs are not hedge funds or private equity funds—institutions with a singleminded focus on their short-term financial returns. Instead, more often than not,
the institutions that have stepped up to serve as plaintiffs in these suits are public
pension or labor funds.248 As other scholars have documented, these funds are
“not motivated by purely economic interests in deciding to take part in
litigation.”249 Instead, “[i]n addition to believing that they can improve
settlements to their own benefit, lead plaintiff applicants may be motivated to
serve by a sense of moral and civic duty to act in the face of fraud.”250 Their
participation benefits securities litigation, as suits filed by public pension or
labor funds are associated with greater recoveries and lower attorneys’ fees than
suits filed by other types of plaintiffs.251 One could imagine these same
institutions being the first movers in procedural rulemaking.
Other types of institutions are also focused on broader issues of governance
and accountability as a way to enhance the value of their investment portfolios.
Vanguard, for example, has four pillars of corporate governance that guide its
investments. In its pillar of governance structure, Vanguard states, “We believe
that shareholders should be able to hold directors accountable as needed through
certain governance and bylaw provisions.”252 Similarly, BlackRock recently
stated that its “philosophy on corporate governance” included the core idea that
“[c]ompanies and their boards should be accountable to shareholders and
structured with appropriate checks and balances to ensure that they operate in
shareholders’ interests.”253 In other words, these institutions think that board
accountability is so crucial to their financial strategy that they have put it front
and center in their investment plans. Procedural rulemaking is entirely consistent
with this investment strategy because it enhances one of the primary means of
holding board members accountable.

248
James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV.
355, 369-70 (2008).
249
David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 157, 174 (2012).
250
Id.
251
Id. at 159 (noting improved outcomes for shareholders when public pension or labor
funds take lead plaintiff position).
252
Investment Stewardship Pillars, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/investment-stewardship-pillars/ [https://perma.cc/LK78-F9H2] (last visited Apr.
6, 2019).
253
BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE &
ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 2 (2017), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-br/literature/
fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-1engprinciples-global-122011.pdf [https://perma.cc/4
FEQ-2X9Z].
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These institutions could also take steps to reduce the costs of procedural
rulemaking. A number of different companies could use a single set of
procedural rules. Institutional investors could draft—or hire procedural experts
to draft—a common set of proposed rules, and then work to get these rules
adopted at a number of the companies in which they invest. In this way, the costs
of drafting these rules would be divided among the different companies in their
investment portfolio. Institutional investors could also work together to draft
these rules, further lowering their individual costs.254 Or, as discussed in greater
detail below, proxy advisory services, such as Institutional Shareholder
Services, could draft a common set of proposed rules that its member companies
could then propose to the companies in which they invest, thereby spreading the
costs across many investors.255 Any of these options would allow investors to
spread the costs of procedural rulemaking across their portfolio. In short,
collective action could solve the collective action problem.
Putting all of this together, institutional investors stand on both sides of
shareholder lawsuits, receiving any financial benefits but also paying the costs.
As a result, as a group, these investors have the greatest financial incentive to
fix the problems in these suits. The challenge comes in encouraging individual
institutions to overcome the free rider problem to promote new procedural rules.
Public pension and labor funds, or other like-minded institutional investors, are
best suited to take the lead in these reforms because they are committed to
corporate governance more broadly and thus are more willing to incur the costs
of implementing these rules.
2.

The Right Organizational Structure

Institutional investors, including public pension and labor funds, also have the
right organizational structure to engage in procedural rulemaking. As this
Section discusses, institutional investors are already engaged in a variety of
activism efforts, and procedural rulemaking would complement these existing
efforts. It would also allow them to have a broader impact on shareholder
litigation compared to their current practice of serving as plaintiffs in individual
lawsuits. This Section first discusses how procedural rulemaking would fit into
the larger sphere of shareholder activism before turning to the specific means by
which institutional investors could promote new procedural rules.
a. A Complementary Form of Activism
Over the last twenty years, institutional investors have been increasingly
active in attempting to influence their portfolio companies. In 2016 alone,
investors put forth more than five hundred shareholder proposals at U.S. publicly
254
See, e.g., Choi & Fisch, supra note 235, at 319 (discussing “coalition-building efforts
between more activist and less activist funds” in promoting corporate governance reform).
255
See infra notes 262-264 and accompanying text (detailing actions taken by proxy
advisory services).
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traded companies, more than half of which related to issues of corporate
governance.256 Activists also launched proxy contests and engaged in other
efforts to gain board representation in more than one hundred campaigns in the
2017 proxy season, and these efforts have been increasingly successful.257
Finally, as discussed above, institutional investors constitute nearly half of the
lead plaintiffs in securities class actions, and they file a significant percentage of
merger class actions and shareholder derivative suits.258 Overall, spending on
shareholder activism now exceeds forty billion dollars per year,259 with one
leading law firm stating that the rise of shareholder activism over the past decade
has caused a “seismic shift” in the relationship between corporations and their
shareholders.260
As a result, large investors already have staffs and infrastructure devoted to
corporate governance efforts.261 These staffs are often small, but they think
systematically about how to improve corporate governance across their portfolio
companies.262 Many investors have also published detailed corporate

256

See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 1 (2017),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2017_Proxy_Season_Rev
iew.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KR8-LSZ6] (outlining statistics related to shareholder proposals).
257
See J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., THE 2017 PROXY SEASON: GLOBALIZATION AND A NEW
NORMAL FOR SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 11-12 (2017), https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/
1320739681811.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z5G-LSQK] (discussing success rate of proxy votes
that went to vote).
258
See David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical
Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38
DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 907 (2014) (finding that “institutional investors play as large of a role
in these cases as they do in federal securities fraud class actions, leading 41% of them”).
259
See Christopher P. Skroupa, 2017 and Beyond—Major Trends Shaping Shareholder
Activism, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2017, 8:43 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christophers
kroupa/2017/10/31/2017-and-beyond-major-trends-shaping-shareholder-activism/#171bd68
c15e7 [https://perma.cc/DY28-WUEG] (“Activist shareholders have deployed $45 billion in
new campaigns year to date, nearly double the amount for all of 2016.”).
260
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2016 U.S. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS 1 (2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_
2016_U.S._Shareholder_Activism_Review_and_Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/734X-58
5N] (“The past decade has seen a seismic shift in the relations between companies and their
shareholders.”).
261
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 483
(2014) (“[C]ertain institutional investors have staffs who have jobs and influence largely
because of the proliferating number of votes that stockholders are asked to cast.”).
262
See George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287,
1301 (“Many institutions (especially the larger ones) maintain internal staffs to research proxy
issues, and they often reject the advice of a proxy advisor and follow the contrary
recommendations of their own staffs.”).
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governance principles that inform their voting practices.263 Proxy advisory
services support these efforts, providing detailed recommendations to
institutional investors on specific issues.264
Shareholder litigation has been largely absent from these efforts. Some public
pension and labor funds regularly serve as representative plaintiffs in
shareholder lawsuits, but otherwise most institutional investors have not paid
much attention to what happens in the courtroom. Activist investors are focused
on market-based forms of activism, seeking to unseat directors or pushing
shareholder proposals to change specific governance practices, rather than filing
shareholder lawsuits.265
This strategy has drawbacks. Market-based activism aims to create a solid
governance foundation within target corporations, ensuring that people with the
right skills and incentives are on corporate boards and that these boards are
pursuing the right management strategies. These efforts are crucial, but they
offer little protection to shareholders if things go wrong. Even the best
governance foundation cannot prevent every form of managerial wrongdoing.
Indeed, if corporate law teaches us anything, it is that managers are ever-creative
when it comes to enriching themselves at the expense of shareholders. Litigation
supported by the right procedural rules is therefore an essential complement to
existing forms of shareholder activism.
Procedural rulemaking is also a more influential strategy than serving as
plaintiffs in individual lawsuits. By serving as representative plaintiffs,
institutional investors can influence the individual cases in which they serve, but
they cannot stop other shareholders from filing their own meritless suits.
Investors can object to settlements in these other cases, but this is also a
piecemeal approach to litigation reform because objectors have to appear in
individual cases to contest the settlement.266 In addition, serving as an objector
only allows shareholders to object at the final stage of the litigation.267 It does
not allow them to object to other litigation decisions, including whether to file
the case in the first place.
Serving as a lead plaintiff also puts heavy demands on an institution’s time
and resources. One institutional investor, for example, stated that it costs
between twenty-five thousand and one hundred thousand dollars of
263
See, e.g., supra notes 252-253 and accompanying text (discussing governance
principles of BlackRock and Vanguard).
264
See Edelman, Thomas & Thompson, supra note 243, at 1361 (“[T]he birth of proxy
advisory firms, including Institutional Shareholder Services (‘ISS’), . . . help[ed] address the
costs of voting and the collective action problems inherent in coordinated institutional
shareholder action.”).
265
See supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text (discussing statistics associated with
activist investors).
266
See, e.g., Schultz v. Ginsburg, 965 A.2d 661, 669-71 (Del. 2009) (discussing standards
objectors must meet to nullify security class action settlement).
267
See id.
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unreimbursed staff time to serve as lead plaintiff.268 Given the time burdens, this
institution stated that it can only serve as lead plaintiff in one or two cases at a
time.269 Some scholars have suggested that it is only worth an institutional
investor’s time and money to serve as lead plaintiff if the investor has at least
one million dollars at stake in the litigation.270 Even apart from these financial
constraints, the PSLRA places a limit on the number of cases in which an
institutional investor can serve as lead plaintiff.271 As a result, there are both
economic and legal limitations to how many cases investors can influence by
serving as lead plaintiff.
In contrast, procedural rulemaking offers a number of advantages. As noted
above, a single set of rules can be used at a number of companies. By investing
the time and money to draft a single set of rules, investors can impact litigation
practices across their investment portfolio.
Moreover, procedural rulemaking may appeal to a broader group of
institutional investors. Prior empirical work revealed that, although many
institutional investors care deeply about corporate governance, they do not
engage in shareholder activism because they do not want to take a
confrontational stance toward corporate management.272 Trying to unseat a
board member or block a deal proposed by the board pits institutional
shareholders against management in a way that can have long-term ramifications
for an institution’s relationship with the company. This is especially true if the
institution has other business dealings with the company. Similarly, institutions
inevitably come into conflict with management when they agree to serve as
representative plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits. However, the process of
adopting new procedural rules does not need to be antagonistic. Rather than a
zero-sum negotiation, shareholders can work with corporate boards to craft new
procedural rules. Procedural rulemaking can be a more cooperative enterprise
than most other forms of shareholder activism.

268

See Cox & Thomas, supra note 236, at 1621 n.130 (discussing cost of litigation and
burden of litigation on firms).
269
See id. at 1622 n.134 (“One institutional investor has told us that because of staffing
limits, it can only take on one or two cases at a time. To focus on the biggest impact cases, its
threshold claim for considering a lead plaintiff position is $7 million.”).
270
See id. at 1621 (“In any event, this analysis suggests that a minimum claim size of $1
million is necessary for an institution to give serious consideration to becoming a lead
plaintiff.”).
271
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2012) (limiting number of cases in which plaintiff can
be a lead plaintiff to five at time unless court permission is received).
272
See Choi & Fisch, supra note 235, at 319 (stating that institutional investors attribute
their lack of involvement in activist activities in part to “their desire to avoid confrontational
behavior”).
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b. Two Paths to Procedural Reform
Institutional investors may be organizationally well-suited to engage in
procedural rulemaking, but it would not necessarily be easy for them to get their
portfolio companies to adopt these procedures. Institutional investors have two
different paths available to them when it comes to adding new procedures to a
corporation’s bylaws.
First, they could propose the amendments to the bylaws themselves, although
this is easier said than done. Delaware corporate law gives shareholders the right
to amend corporate bylaws,273 but it does not make it easy for them to come
together to do so. An investor can propose a bylaw amendment to be voted upon
by shareholders at a corporation’s annual meeting. To do so, however, it would
need to solicit the proxies of other shareholders in support of its proposal,274 a
time-intensive and expensive process. Alternatively, it can include its proposal
on the corporation’s proxy, which is subject to a host of complex requirements
under the federal securities laws.275 Shareholders could also act to amend the
bylaws outside of the annual meeting through written consent,276 but the
dispersed ownership at most public corporations makes this option difficult as
well. These options are all possible, but the time and expense associated with
them would discourage all but the most committed shareholders.
A more feasible option is for institutional investors to work with corporate
boards to draft new procedural rules. It is far easier for boards to amend the
bylaws because they can do so at a regularly-scheduled board meeting.277 For all
of the reasons discussed above, boards should not have sole control over the
rulemaking process, but they could partner with institutional investors to put into
place neutral rules that curb the excesses of shareholder litigation without
screening out meritorious suits. In this way, institutional investors could provide
thought leadership on these issues without incurring the cost of a proxy
campaign. This approach is consistent with a growing trend in corporate law of
institutions and boards working together to influence corporate governance.278
273
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (outlining requirements for giving proper
notice).
274
See Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad
Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 28 (2011) (arguing that,
“as a practical matter,” shareholders’ ability to amend corporate bylaws “can be
operationalized in a typical public company only by aggregating proxies in favor of the
proposal from a large number of minority shareholders—a costly endeavor indeed”).
275
As one example, the proposal can only be five hundred words. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(c), (d) (2018). It would be nearly impossible to craft and defend specific procedural reforms
within this small number of words.
276
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (providing for written consent in lieu of meeting).
277
See id. § 109(b) (providing for director vote to amend bylaws).
278
See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 821, 831 (reviewing evidence that “significant number of investors [have] sought
greater engagement with the board” and stating that “shareholders and their advocates have
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Studies demonstrate that institutional investors routinely work with boards to
achieve their desired reforms. For example, one study found that one-third of
public pension and labor funds attempted to influence corporate managers
through direct negotiation or letters.279 Another study examined the activism
efforts of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of American-College
Retirement Equities Fund (“TIAA-CREF”) and found that the companies came
to an agreement with the target company before a formal vote more than seventy
percent of the time.280 Across different forms of activism, shareholders are
increasingly negotiating for the relief they want, rather than entering into pitched
battles with corporate boards.281 Accordingly, the type of cooperative
engagement proposed here is not unusual in the world of shareholder activism.
This engagement would ideally occur when there is no ongoing shareholder
litigation at the company at issue and, therefore, the board would not have their
own potential liability front and center in their minds. During this process,
shareholders will have to be cognizant of directors’ structural bias, but they can
also benefit from boards’ wisdom and experience in participating in these suits.
This partnership would address the oft-raised concern that shareholder activism
preempts the role of corporate boards in managing corporations,282 while also
addressing the reality that boards have a conflict of interest, meaning they should
not have unchecked power to propose new limitations on shareholder litigation.
c.

Explaining the Status Quo

If there is money to be made and cooperative relationships to be formed from
procedural rulemaking, why are shareholders not already exploring this option?
proposed a range of different strategies for increasing their interactions with board members
from annual corporate governance calls with directors, to periodic ‘investor days’ at the
corporation spearheaded by directors”); Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of
Private Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C. L. REV. 171, 171-72 (2009) (“An increasing
number of shareholders are demonstrating a preference for negotiations over such traditional
forms of activism as shareholder proposals, proxy contests, and litigation.”).
279
See Choi & Fisch, supra note 235, at 329.
280
See Willard T. Carleton, James M. Nelson & Michael S. Weisbach, The Influence of
Institutions on Corporate Governance Through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAACREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335, 1335 (1998).
281
See, e.g., Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering
of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 265 (2016) (“The shareholder proposal settlement has
become increasingly popular as a tool for negotiating private rules for corporations on matters
that are, by long tradition, subjects of public regulation.”); Lee Harris, Corporate Elections
and Tactical Settlements, 39 J. CORP. L. 221, 224 (2014) (describing “elaborate dance” by
corporate boards “to avoid a contested corporate election”).
282
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53
UCLA L. REV. 601, 626 (2006) (“Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking
seems likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable;
namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board
of directors.”).
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In many respects, this is the million-dollar question. Sophisticated investors,
after all, do not usually leave money or opportunity on the table. The fact that
they have not gotten into the procedural rulemaking business perhaps suggests
that they might not be interested in this new form of activism.
There are, however, other explanations for the current state of affairs. First,
procedural innovation in corporate charters and bylaws is a fairly new
development. The Delaware Court of Chancery did not suggest it as an option
until 2010, and even then it was only raised in the context of forum-selection
bylaws.283 Boards led the next round of procedural rulemaking involving feeshifting bylaws, which were subject to a significant amount of criticism and legal
wrangling (and for good reason, as discussed in Part II).284 Throughout this
period, many institutional investors were watching carefully, with Institutional
Shareholder Services advising companies to vote against most fee-shifting
bylaws.285 More generally, however, procedural rulemaking may be in a holding
pattern of sorts while the financial markets seek to better understand its legal
limits.
Second, procedural rulemaking is out of most institutional investors’ normal
wheelhouse. Institutional investors are experts in judging financial risk and
pricing companies, not altering legal rules. And altering legal rules is not child’s
play. It is difficult to predict the exact impact of raising pleading standards or
changing the scope of discovery. It may not occur to financial analysts to tinker
with the legal rules governing shareholder lawsuits, and even if it does, they may
fear that they will accidentally make the problems in these suits even worse.
Finally, the market is not as efficient or rational as we sometimes think.
Investors are skilled at pricing companies, but this expertise does not necessarily
translate into other ways of making money. A 2005 study, for example, found
that institutional investors rarely submit claims in securities class action
settlements, even though these claims could be worth significant amounts of
money.286 The authors tracked one hundred eighteen settlements in securities

283
In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“If they do, and
if boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an
efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to
respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”).
284
See, e.g., Lebovitch & van Kwawegen, supra note 14, at 515-16.
285
See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES SUMMARY PROXY VOTING
GUIDELINES: 2017 BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 26 (2016), https://www.issgover
nance.com/file/policy/2017-us-summary-voting-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWE7-8T
8N] (“Generally vote against bylaws that mandate fee-shifting whenver plaintiffs are not
completely successful on the merits . . . .”).
286
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Their Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 454 (2005) (“[W]e
determine that a large majority of institutional investors failed to file claims in securities fraud
class action settlements.”).
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class actions, finding that only twenty eight percent of institutional investors
filed claims in these settlements,287 despite the fact that the average mean loss
was approximately eight hundred fifty thousand dollars.288 Collectively, the
authors concluded that institutional investors let “billions slip through their
fingers,” which they attributed in part to organizational lapses within these
institutions.289 This example illustrates that institutional investors are only
human, at least metaphorically speaking. They focus on their strengths—valuing
companies and assessing risk—but pay less attention to matters outside their
traditional expertise.290
Yet the example of the PSLRA demonstrates the possibility of changing the
status quo when it comes to investor inaction. It took institutional investors a
while to take Congress up on its invitation to serve as lead plaintiff in securities
class actions, but eventually they did.291 The market, in other words, can be
sticky but ultimately responsive. It sometimes takes time for investors to
recognize economic opportunities, but in the past, they have responded once
these opportunities are brought to their attention.
C.

Legal Pathways

If institutional investors decide that they want to take on this new role, will
the law stand in their way? In other words, can institutional investors actually
change the procedural rules in the ways suggested here? Contracting parties have
long opted out of certain default rules governing how their future disputes will
be decided.292 Parties, for example, can add forum selection clauses to their
agreements to direct their disputes to a specific court.293 They can also adopt

287

See id. at 420-25.
See id. at 424 (“We find that the average loss is roughly $275,000, which is substantially
lower than the almost $850,000 average value reported.”).
289
See id. at 425-32 (outlining four reasons for failure of institutional investors to join
class actions: (1) “[f]inancial service providers try not to align themselves with protagonists
of their clientele”; (2) class actions are slow and institutional investors may not have time; (3)
negative perceptions of class action returns, despite evidence to the contrary; and (4)
communication issues between broker and the corporation).
290
See id.
291
See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 236, at 1602 (“Despite this impressive list of
benefits, investors have been slow to answer the call to become lead plaintiffs.”).
292
See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 507, 512 (2011) (describing “widespread perception that customized procedure
is an increasingly important feature of contracting practice among U.S. firms”); Judith Resnik,
Procedure As Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005) (“[M]ini-codes of civil
procedure are being created by courts, agencies, and a multitude of private providers. The
aspiration for a trans-substantive procedural regime embedded in the Federal Rules has been
supplanted by an array of contextualized processes.”).
293
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991) (upholding forum
selection clause on back of cruise ship ticket).
288
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arbitration clauses to opt out of the judicial system altogether,294 and agree on
how they will allocate the costs of litigation.295 The procedures suggested in this
Article, however, go well beyond the dispute resolution provisions typically
included in commercial contracts.296 This Section addresses the legal hurdles
that institutional investors may face in implementing customized procedural
rules. It first explores possible restrictions under corporate and securities laws
before turning to limitations arising under procedural law. As we will see, there
are not clear legal guidelines, although recent case law provides investors with
reason to be more optimistic about their ability to engage in procedural private
ordering in cases filed under state law as opposed to cases filed under federal
law.
1. Corporate and Securities Laws
The procedural rules outlined in this Section relate to both fiduciary duty
claims made under state law and securities class actions filed under the federal
securities laws. As a result, these rules will have to pass muster under both state
corporate law and federal securities law, at least if they purport to cover both
types of claims. At the state level, Delaware has been the pioneer in addressing
private ordering in shareholder litigation, with few other states addressing the
issue. As discussed above, the Delaware Court of Chancery itself first raised297
the issue and upheld various types of procedural amendments to corporate
bylaws.298 The Delaware legislature banned one specific form of private

294
See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act does not permit states to prohibit class action waivers in arbitration
contracts).
295
See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389,
419 (“In the EDGAR database, terms shifting costs to the losing party in litigation are
omnipresent.”); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865, 1922 (2015) (finding that 23.9% of sample contracts included
loser-pay provisions).
296
See Hoffman, supra note 295, at 395-96 (“We appear to be currently in a period where
some terms are widely accepted—like forum selection—while others operate only at the
margins—like those that would limit discovery.”).
297
In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with
charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”).
298
See, e.g., ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014)
(“[W]e hold that fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws can be valid and
enforceable under Delaware law.”); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73
A.3d 934, 956 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The plaintiffs’ argument that stockholders must approve a
forum selection bylaw for it to be contractually binding is an interpretation that contradicts
the plain terms of the contractual framework chosen by stockholders who buy stock.”).
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ordering (fee-shifting provisions)299 but it has expressly permitted forum
selection bylaws (as long as Delaware is the selected forum) and stayed silent
on other forms of private ordering.300
This does not mean that Delaware courts would approve all forms of
procedural private ordering. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the
Supreme Court of Delaware held that fee-shifting bylaws are facially valid.301 It
then noted, however, that whether a specific bylaw provision is enforceable
depends “on the manner in which it was adopted and the circumstances under
which it was invoked.”302 The Court then referenced earlier decisions
invalidating bylaws that were enacted by directors to protect their positions as
board members or by a controlling shareholder seeking to enlarge its own power
in inequitable ways.303 Although the Delaware legislature later prohibited feeshifting bylaws,304 the court’s analysis provides a useful framework for
analyzing other possible forms of private ordering related to shareholder
litigation.
Under this framework, the proposed procedures set out above should be
facially permissible.305 The motives of the enacting party (either the board or
majority shareholders) matter, however, so a court could theoretically strike
down a bylaw amendment adopted at a specific company if the court believed
that the amendment was motivated by selfish or other improper motives.306 For
example, if a controlling shareholder included a bylaw amendment that made it
impossible for any other shareholders to challenge the controller’s breach of
fiduciary duty, a Delaware court would likely invalidate the bylaw.307 In general,
however, Delaware currently gives corporations wide latitude to amend the rules
governing shareholder litigation.
That said, private ordering is still a relatively new phenomenon in Delaware,
and new limitations could emerge, especially as Delaware is asked to evaluate
new variants of procedural bylaws. Some scholars have suggested that
299
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (“The bylaws may not contain any provision
that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the
corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim.”).
300
See id. § 115 (“The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent
with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate claims shall be
brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State.”).
301
See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014).
302
See id.
303
See id. at 558-59 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)
(setting aside board adopted amendment that moved meeting one month earlier); Hollinger
Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080 (Del. Ch. 2004) (enjoining bylaw that required
unanimous assent on any board action)).
304
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b).
305
See supra Part II (discussing proposed procedures).
306
See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558-59.
307
See id.
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Delaware’s permissive approach may not always be appropriate.308 Professor
Verity Winship, for example, has noted that section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law permits corporations to eliminate the liability of
directors for violations of the duty of care, but not the duty of loyalty.309 On its
face, this restriction concerns the substantive law, not procedural rules, but
substance and procedure are not wholly separate. Given section 102(b)(7)
limitations, a corporation should not be able to use procedural rules to block
claims that it is not allowed to eliminate directly.310 As an example, a standing
requirement that is so stringent that makes it impossible for any shareholder to
file a duty of loyalty claim would contravene section 102(b)(7), despite its
procedural frame. Similarly, a heightened pleading requirement that required
representative plaintiffs to plead information to which they do not have access
could also run afoul of the law. The procedures set out in Part II, however, are
intended to better sort fiduciary duty claims, not rule them out entirely, and thus
should be permissible.311 Accordingly, even if Delaware does adopt additional
limits on private ordering, investors should still be able to adopt the suggestions
in this Article, at least when it comes to fiduciary duty claims.
The federal securities laws raise far greater hurdles for shareholders seeking
to experiment with customized procedure.312 The securities laws expressly
invalidate “any . . . provision binding any person . . . [to] waive compliance with
any provision” of the securities laws.313 The Supreme Court held that a provision
is void under securities laws if it “weaken[s] [a party’s] ability to recover.”314
Interpreting this standard, the Court has further held that mandatory arbitration
clauses do not run afoul of this provision because plaintiffs can still recover on

308
See, e.g., Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 223, at 357-58 (arguing that bylaw
changes should be governed by Unocal standard).
309
See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); Winship, supra note 20, at 524-25 (explaining
limitations imposed by section 102(b)(7)).
310
See Winship, supra note 20, at 525 (stating that this approach “would not prevent
procedural limits that fall short of waiver”).
311
Delaware has also held that, although shareholders can amend corporate bylaws on
their own, their amendments cannot infringe on the board’s fundamental right to control the
business and affairs of the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). Delaware courts
have held that this limitation means that shareholder-driven amendments to corporate bylaws
can only “define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made.” See CA,
Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008). This limitation should
not affect the proposals in this Article, which, by definition, relate to procedural matters.
312
See Winship, supra note 20, at 529-30 (stating that “securities law does not have an
enabling structure that would support broad experimentation”).
313
See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012); id. § 78cc(a) (“Any condition stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”).
314
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) (quoting Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953)).
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their claims within arbitration.315 Scholars have speculated, however, that other
types of customized procedures would not pass muster if they make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to recover on their claims.316
This interpretation could call into question some of the procedures
recommended in this Article, at least when applied to federal securities class
actions. Standing requirements, for example, would not only weaken certain
shareholders’ right to sue, but bar them entirely. Similarly, fee-shifting or costshifting provisions could discourage shareholders from suing if they fear that
they could later be held personally liable for the defendants’ fees and costs. As
a result, the securities laws may well prohibit these forms of customized
procedure.317
Other forms, however, should pass muster. Nonwaivable forum selection
clauses, for example, simply specify where shareholders must sue; they do not
weaken their right to sue. Similarly, bans on nonmonetary settlements limit the
forms of relief that shareholders can obtain, but do not impact whether
shareholders can sue in the first instance. This analysis means that the securities
laws may permit a narrower range of procedures than state corporate law, but at
least some of the proposed procedures are likely still permissible. In drafting
their proposed bylaws, however, shareholders should be careful to limit the
applicability of those procedures that may run afoul of the securities laws.318
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently addressed another possible legal
hurdle related to procedural private ordering in federal securities class actions.
Building on the scholarship of Professor Ann Lipton,319 the Delaware Court of
Chancery recognized that charters and bylaws are intended only to address the
internal affairs of corporations, including “the fiduciary relationships that exist
within the corporate form.”320 In contrast, the court held that these state-created
documents cannot limit the laws of other sovereigns, including the federal
securities laws, even if the plaintiff is a shareholder of the corporation in

315

See id. (“The voluntariness of the agreement is irrelevant to this inquiry: if a stipulation
waives compliance with a statutory duty, it is void under § 29(a), whether voluntary or not.”).
316
See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Intersection of Fee-Shifting Bylaws and
Securities Fraud Litigation, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 403 (2015) (acknowledging that “no
court has yet addressed whether a fee-shifting bylaw is void under the anti-waiver provisions
as applied to federal securities law claims,” but stating that he believes that they would be
void because “a fee-shifting bylaw weakens [shareholders’] ability to recover under federal
securities law”).
317
See Shearson/Am. Express, 480 U.S. at 220.
318
See, e.g., HeartWare Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 27, 2016) (adopting
forum selection clause that only applied to state fiduciary duty claims).
319
See Lipton, supra note 214, at 597 (“Corporate governance regulation concerns the
balance of power between its shareholders, its officers, and its directors, and commonly falls
within the rubric understood as the corporations’ ‘internal affairs.’”).
320
Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 19, 2018).
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question.321 As a result, the court invalidated a charter provision that required
the corporation in question’s shareholders to bring all claims under the Securities
Act of 1933 in federal court.322
This case creates another hurdle for institutional investors who may want to
alter the procedural rules that govern securities class actions. Viewing these
hurdles in tandem, federal law explicitly prohibits any constraint on a
shareholder’s ability to file a federal securities claim, and state law prohibits use
of state-created charters and bylaws to affect these claims. As a result, under
current law at least, any amendments to procedural rules should be limited to
shareholder lawsuits filed under state law and should explicitly disclaim
application of these amendments to federal securities class actions.
2. Procedural Law
The corporate and securities laws are not the only laws that govern
customized procedure. Shareholders must also ensure that procedural law
permits them to amend the specific procedures in question. For example, can
parties alter the discovery rules set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) and Twombly? Can they completely replace the federal rules governing
discovery with their own? These questions are perhaps even more difficult than
those in the prior Section because the field of civil procedure provides fewer
clear guidelines. Most procedural rules do not specify whether they are default
or mandatory rules, and courts have provided little overarching guidance on this
question.
Despite this legal ambiguity, there are three clear limitations. First, parties
cannot enter into private agreements that expand the jurisdiction of the courts,323
a limitation that in this context primarily affects forum selection bylaws. If
shareholders propose such bylaws, they cannot choose a federal forum for all
shareholder claims if the federal courts do not have a basis for jurisdiction over
these claims. Conversely, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal
securities claims, so shareholders could not choose a state court forum for these
claims.324 Second, although there is some debate about whether bylaws are
technically contracts,325 parties could still be subject to common-law principles
321
See id. at *18 (“[A] Delaware corporation cannot use its charter or bylaws to regulate
the forum in which parties bring external claims, such as federal securites law claims.”).
322
Id. at *23 (“The nominal defendants lack authority to use their certificates of
incorporation to regulate claims under the 1933 Act. The Federal Forum Provisions are
ineffective and invalid.”).
323
See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 180, at 583 (outlining limitations on procedural rule
changing through contract).
324
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012).
325
Compare ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014)
(holding that corporate bylaws are “contracts among a corporation’s shareholders” (quoting
Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010))), with Lipton, supra
note 214, at 587 (arguing that “corporate governance arrangements are not contractual”).
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rooted in contract law, which prohibits provisions that are unconscionable or
made under duress.326 In a number of cases, for example, courts have used the
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate limitations on discovery that
unreasonably limit one side’s access to information, especially in cases
involving substantially unequal bargaining power between the parties.327
Finally, shareholders cannot include customized procedures in corporate bylaws
that significantly impair the rights of third parties.328 In this discovery context,
for example, this limitation might mean that bylaws cannot expand Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 45 subpoena power to compel third parties to provide more
information than they would otherwise have to provide in a shareholder
lawsuit.329
Beyond these specific limitations, scholars argue that there are other, more
fundamental limits on parties’ ability to craft their own procedures. These
proposed limits reflect foundational concerns about the influence of private
parties over the workings of a deliberately public judicial system. Scholars have
phrased this concern in different ways. Professor Sarah Randolph Cole argues
that a court reviewing customized procedures should determine whether the
agreement would “impermissibly undermine the institutional integrity of the
court.”330 Professor Robert Bone argues that bespoke procedure cannot interfere
with the judge’s ability to engage in principled reasoning, which he argues is the
“core element of adjudication.”331 Professor Judith Resnik influentially
criticized the contractual model of civil procedure as failing to take account of
“substantive agendas about the meaning of justice.”332 Regardless of the specific
phrasing, the idea is that there are certain attributes and goals of the American
judicial system that are so fundamental to its legitimacy that private parties
cannot contract around them.333
326
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (referencing
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability”).
327
See, e.g., Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the
Norms Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 513-14 (2013) (“The availability
of discovery has become a lynchpin of state law unconscionability, and courts have not
hesitated to find arbitration agreements unconscionable that attempt to limit the amount of
discovery available to plaintiffs.”).
328
But see Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1373 (2012) (arguing that party decision-making in litigation
may already harm third parties in number of ways, and yet no one seriously suggests
prohibiting all party decisions that impact third parties).
329
FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
330
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1205 (2000).
331
See, e.g., Bone, supra note 328, at 1390.
332
See Resnik, supra note 292, at 666 (arguing that courts should not ignore “political and
distribution[al] consequences of procedural rulemaking”).
333
Id. (“The deployment of process to achieve substantive goals is deeply entrenched in
the Constitution.”).
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These concerns reflect the fact that litigation between private parties is not an
entirely private enterprise, as the example of shareholder litigation itself reflects.
Shareholder litigation is not just about curtailing agency costs in the particular
companies that are sued; these suits also aim to raise the standards of managerial
behavior across the corporate world.334 Through the concept of general
deterrence, multimillion dollar judgments are intended to send a message not
just to the targeted defendants, but also to managers at other companies who are
in a position to engage in similar misconduct.335 Even more broadly, shareholder
litigation aspires to improve the functioning of the financial markets, ensuring
that shareholders have sufficient confidence in the markets to invest their
capital.336
These aspirational goals mean that institutional investors and corporate
boards should not have unfettered power to re-write the procedural rules that
govern shareholder litigation. Judges must play a key role in ensuring that any
new rules are sufficiently aligned with the public interest. Current law does not
precisely delineate the scope of this oversight responsibility, but judges should
review any new procedures against the backdrop of the public interest, striking
down those that unnecessarily threaten the shareholder litigation enterprise.
The procedures proposed in Part II should not run afoul of these limitations.
If done right, they would not improperly expand the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, violate the unconscionability doctrine, or impair the right of third parties.
Nor should they raise eyebrows on public policy grounds. The goal of these
procedures is to better sort cases with merit from those without—a goal that is
aligned with the public interest in encouraging efficient litigation. Indeed, these
provisions should enhance the compensatory and deterrent goals of shareholder
lawsuits, which both shareholders and the public more broadly should support.
If investors overreach in particular instances, however, the judicial branch can
invalidate the provisions. The legislative branch can also intervene and
statutorily overrule the provisions, as Delaware did in the context of fee-shifting
bylaws.337

334

See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 257, 280-81 (2015) (“The norms that flow from litigation’s enforcing fiduciary
standards strengthen sensible management of firms and thus contribute to increased economic
activity. The norms themselves shape best practices and in that way reduce agency costs as
well as uncertainty. Each in turn yields a public benefit.”).
335
See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1090 (1997) (stating that three benefits of shareholder litigation
normally mentioned are “compensation, specific deterrence, and general deterrence”).
336
See, e.g., id. at 1099-105.
337
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019); Francis Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New
Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6,
2015), https://www.delawarelitigation.com/2015/03/articles/commentary/delaware-proposes
-new-fee-shifting-and-forum-selection-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/J7JD-Z4SY]
(describing process leading up to the legislation).
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In the end, shareholders have a crucial role to play in reforming shareholder
litigation, but they cannot re-draft procedural rules in a vacuum. Shareholder
litigation has both public and private aims, and any new procedures adopted
among private parties must be subject to public oversight by judges and
legislators. The question therefore is not whether shareholders should control
these lawsuits to the exclusion of other gatekeepers. Instead, it is whether
shareholders should play a more active role in this area than they currently do,
while still subject to oversight by judges and legislators. A rulemaking
partnership will protect the public interest more than any of the individual
gatekeepers will do on their own.
Stepping back, therefore, procedural law likely places fewer limits on
investors’ ability to rewrite procedural rules than the state and federal
substantive law. As discussed above, given current SEC regulations and relevant
case law, institutional investors can likely rewrite the procedural rules that
govern shareholder lawsuits filed under state law.338 On the other hand, they are
likely to face significant legal challenges if they extend their efforts to federal
securities class actions.339 Investors, however, should not view these limitations
as a reason to stay away from procedural private ordering altogether. Rewriting
the procedural rules that govern state fiduciary duty claims would have a
significant impact on this entire category of litigation, which includes nearly all
shareholder derivative suits and many merger class actions.
Just as importantly, the rules related to procedural private ordering are still in
their infancy. It has been less than a decade since the Delaware Court of
Chancery first suggested that corporations adopt forum selection clauses for
these state claims,340 and courts and the SEC are just starting to envision the
possibilities of private ordering in this legal sphere. Moreover, much of the
concern about procedural private ordering stems from the fact that corporate
boards have driven these efforts, and the results have reflected their bias and
self-interest. Allowing institutional investors to lead this effort does not raise the
same concerns because they have the right financial incentives to adopt
measured procedural reforms. If they are successful in reforming shareholder
lawsuits filed under state law, perhaps lawmakers will expand their ability to
impact lawsuits filed under federal law as well. In short, the time has come to
experiment more broadly with procedural private ordering, especially if this
experimentation is in the hands of those with the most financial skin in the game.
CONCLUSION
Shareholder litigation is a failed experiment. Judges, legislatures, and
corporate boards have all tried to fix the problems with these suits, but none of
their proposals have worked. This troubled history presents an opportunity for a
338

See supra notes 312-318 and accompanying text (discussing possible procedural
limitations due to SEC rules).
339
See supra notes 312-318 and accompanying text.
340
In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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new group—institutional investors—to take the lead in reforming this area of
the law. Institutional investors are uniquely situated to take on this challenge
because they stand on both sides of shareholder lawsuits. As a result, they have
financial incentives that the other groups which have tried to reform these suits
do not. Investors can use this position to draw on lessons from the field of civil
procedure, which offers specific solutions to the problems in these cases.
Corporate law has already started to experiment with new procedural rules in
corporate bylaws, but investors can go much further, adopting an array of
procedural options to address the specific challenges in shareholder litigation.
This proposal also offers broader lessons about private ordering in the
litigation system. In most types of litigation, private ordering is one-sided, with
defendants writing the provisions that will govern future litigation. Corporations
and consumers, for example, are equally bound by dispute resolution provisions
included in commercial contracts, even though corporations have nearly
exclusive control over the drafting of these provisions.341 This disparity is then
reflected in the content of the provisions, with the inclusion of arbitration
provisions, class action waivers, and fee-shifting provisions that have sparked
broad public and scholarly apprehension.342 Shareholder litigation, however, is
one of the few areas where the same party stands on both sides of the litigation.
This unique positioning opens the door to a new approach to private ordering in
litigation that balances the competing interests in a more equitable way.
Corporate law should capitalize on this opportunity and give shareholders a
chance to reform shareholder litigation.

341

See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 431 (2002) (“Likely ninety-nine percent of paper
contracts consist of standard forms, and now, with increasing alacrity, people agree to terms
by clicking away at electronic standard forms on web sites and while installing software
(‘clickwrap’ contracts).”).
342
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873 (2011)
(discussing “how to repair contracts that contain excessively one-sided terms”); Daniel Akst,
Opinion, Those Crazy Indemnity Forms We All Sign, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, at SR4.
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